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  INTRODUCTION   
In June and July 2013, documents leaked by a government 
contractor revealed details of three expansive surveillance pro-
grams operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and the Department of Defense on behalf of the National Secu-
rity Agency (NSA).1
 
 1. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Min-
ing Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. 
POST, June 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us 
-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret 
-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html; 
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Cus-
tomers Daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [hereinafter Greenwald, 
Phone Records]; Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Eve-
rything a User Does on the Internet,’ GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, http://www 
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data [here-
inafter Greenwald, XKeyscore]. 
 The first requires that Verizon and other 
telecommunication companies provide to the NSA on a daily 
basis “all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by 
Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and 
abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local 
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telephone calls.”2 Although this program does not allow for the 
collection of content, including customers’ conversations, te-
lephony metadata is a rich source of information, giving au-
thorities vast knowledge about callers’ identity, location, and 
social networks.3 A second program, referred to in leaked doc-
uments as “PRISM,” reportedly allows the NSA and the FBI to 
access “audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, docu-
ments, and connection logs” collected by nine leading U.S. in-
ternet companies, including Google and Facebook.4 The third 
program, called XKeyscore, provides analysts with the capacity 
to mine content and metadata generated by e-mail, chat, and 
browsing activities through a global network of servers and in-
ternet access points.5 These revelations confirm previous re-
ports about a comprehensive domestic surveillance program 
that seeks to provide government agents with contemporary 
and perpetual access to details about everywhere we go and 
everything we do, say, or write, particularly when using or in 
the company of networked technologies.6
 
 2. Verizon Forced to Hand Over Telephone Data‒Full Court Ruling, 
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/ 
jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order [hereinafter FISA]. The NSA subse-
quently released a declassified version of the order. See Declassified Govern-
ment Documents Related to NSA Collection of Telephone Metadata Records, 
WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government 
-documents-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/ (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
  
 3. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Anger Swells After NSA Phone 
Records Court Order Revelations, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www 
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/obama-administration-nsa-verizon 
-records (“[Telephony] metadata . . . can provide authorities with vast 
knowledge about a caller’s identity. . . . [C]ross-checked against other public 
records, the metadata can reveal someone’s name, address, driver’s license, 
credit history, social security number and more.”). 
 4. Gellman & Poitras, supra note 1. The companies identified as partici-
pants in PRISM have denied granting government agents open access to their 
servers. Id. As of this writing, the full truth of the program remains hidden 
behind a veil of alleged national security necessity. 
 5. Greenwald, XKeyscore, supra note 1. 
 6. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY 177–96 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter BAMFORD, SHADDOW]; James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s 
Biggest Spy Center, WIRED MAG., Mar. 15, 2012, available at http://www.wired 
.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1 [hereinafter Bamford, The 
NSA is Building]; Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK 
(Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/12/the-fed 
-who-blew-the-whistle.html; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. 
Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all.  
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The domestic surveillance infrastructure is not confined to 
our networked communications, however. Consider aerial 
drones. No longer just a feature of modern warfare, unmanned 
aerial drones now populate domestic airspace.7 Military-style 
drones operate along the United States border with Mexico.8 
Farther inland, law enforcement agencies are starting to use a 
variety of drones during their routine police operations.9 Many 
of these drones are hardly visible, and some are as small as in-
sects.10 Among the primary advantages of these drone surveil-
lance systems is that they are “covert.”11 As one operator re-
ported: “You don’t hear it, and unless you know what you’re 
looking for, you can’t see it.”12 Drones are also increasingly in-
expensive, with some costing just a few hundred dollars.13 Giv-
en the diversity, power, secrecy, and increasingly modest cost of 
aerial drones, we should expect them to become a more and 
more common presence in our skies.14
We are also increasingly subject to surveillance by systems 
capable of aggregating and analyzing large quantities of infor-
mation from a variety of sources. Take, for example, New 
York’s “Domain Awareness System” (DAS), which was unveiled 
by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray-
  
 
 7. See Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAG., Feb. 11, 2013, at 28, 31–
33; Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are 
-watching-you. In the United States, “50 companies, universities, and govern-
ment organizations are developing and producing some 155 unmanned aircraft 
designs.” Id. In 2010, expenditures on unmanned aircraft in the United States 
exceeded three billion dollars and are expected to surpass seven billion dollars 
over the next ten years. Id.  
 8. Grossman, supra note 7, at 31. 
 9. Id. at 28, 32. 
 10. See id. at 33; John W. Whitehead, Roaches, Mosquitoes and Birds: The 
Coming Micro-Drone Revolution, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2013, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/micro-drones-b-3084965 
.html. 
 11. Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely 
to Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22/AR2011012204111 
.html. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 28. 
 14. See Lynch, supra note 7 (“[S]ome have forecast that by the year 2018 
there will be ‘more than 15,000 [unmanned aircraft systems] in service in the 
U.S., with a total of almost 30,000 deployed worldwide.’”). The pizza chain 
Domino’s is also taking to the air with a delivery drone. See Pizza-Delivery 
Drones? Domino’s Gives it a Shot (NPR radio broadcast June 5, 2013). 
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mond Kelly in August 2012.15 Developed in conjunction with 
Microsoft,16 DAS aggregates and analyzes video streams from 
3,000 public and private security cameras, images from license-
plate readers and traffic cameras, and data from government 
and private databases.17 DAS will ensure the surveillance of 
New Yorkers and the city as a whole, twenty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week.18 Confronted with comparisons to George 
Orwell’s “Big Brother,” Bloomberg replied, “What you’re seeing 
is what the private sector has used for a long time. If you walk 
around with a cell phone, the cell phone company knows where 
you are . . . . We’re not your mom and pop’s police department 
anymore.”19
New Yorkers are not the only people being monitored by 
increasingly expansive and sophisticated surveillance systems. 
The NYPD and Microsoft will be co-marketing DAS for sale to 
other municipalities.
  
20 There are also competitors, such as Ala-
bama’s joint venture with Google dubbed “Virtual Alabama,” 
which collects and mines information from sources as diverse 
as surveillance cameras in public schools, three-dimensional 
satellite and aerial imagery, geospatial analytics, sex offender 
registries, and hospital inventories.21
 
 15. Chris Dolmetsch & Henry Goldman, New York, Microsoft Unveil Joint 
Crime-Tracking System, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 6:19 PM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-08/new-york-microsoft-unveil-joint-crime 
-tracking-system.html. 
  
 16. Id. New York and Microsoft are now marketing the Domain Aware-
ness System to states and municipalities under a profit sharing plan. See Paul 
Harris, NYPD and Microsoft Launch Advanced Citywide Surveillance System, 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 8, 2012, http://theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/08/nypd 
-microsoft-surveillance-system.  
 17. Dolmetsch & Goldman, supra note 15; see also Jack M. Balkin, The 
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) 
(reporting on plans to “mount thousands of cameras throughout Lower Man-
hattan to monitor vehicles and individuals”). 
 18. Public Security Privacy Guidelines, N.Y.C. POLICE DEPARTMENT (Apr. 
2, 2009), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/ 
public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf. 
 19. NYPD’s ‘Domain Awareness’ Surveillance System, Built by Microsoft, 
Unveiled by Bloomberg, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2012, 12:51 PM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/09/nypd-domain-awareness-surveillance 
-system-built-microsoft_n_1759976.html?. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Corey McKenna, Virtual Alabama Facilitates Data Sharing Among 
State and Local Agencies, DIGITAL CMTYS. (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www 
.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Virtual-Alabama-Facilitates-Data-Sharing 
-Among.html. 
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Regional efforts like DAS and Virtual Alabama supplement 
a nationwide network of “fusion centers,”22 which are operated 
as joint ventures between governmental agencies and private 
stakeholders to monitor, store, and mine the contents of elec-
tronic communications, public and private sector databases, 
health records, video feeds, and histories of online activity.23 
Along with these government-run ventures, the marketplace is 
increasingly populated by for-profit data aggregation compa-
nies like ChoicePoint and Acxiom that gather, analyze, pack-
age, and sell vast quantities of personal information on hun-
dreds of millions of Americans for public and private clients.24
These discrete surveillance technologies and mass data col-
lection efforts offer law enforcement and other government en-
tities powerful tools in their ongoing efforts to prevent, detect, 
and prosecute crime, monitor border traffic, and guard against 
threats from international and domestic terrorists.
  
25 On the 
other hand, they implicate individual and collective expecta-
tions of privacy.26
Similar questions came before the Court last year in Unit-
ed States v. Jones.
 These competing interests raise important 
questions about the Fourth Amendment status of new and de-
veloping surveillance technologies. Should we leave the use of 
these technologies to the unfettered discretion of police officers? 
Or should we treat their use as “searches” subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation, perhaps including the warrant re-
quirement?  
27
 
 22. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for 
the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1443 (2011). 
 In that case, law enforcement officers used 
a GPS-enabled tracking device to monitor Jones’s movements 
for four weeks, gathering over 2,000 pages of data in the pro-
 23. Id. at 1451; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH SECURITY: PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND MEDICAL INTEGRATION FOR FUSION CENTERS 8 (2011), available at 
www.it.ojp.gov/docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1450. 
 24. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How 
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your 
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595–96 
(2004); Natasha Singer, A Data Giant Is Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer 
Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1. 
 25. See David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting 
Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745 
(2013), for our exploration of some of these interests. 
 26. See infra Parts I–II (discussing the potential problems with indiscrim-
inate surveillance and how to handle it under the Fourth Amendment). 
 27. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
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cess.28 Although Jones was resolved on narrow grounds, concur-
ring opinions indicate that at least five justices have serious 
Fourth Amendment concerns about law enforcement’s growing 
surveillance capabilities.29 Those justices insisted that citizens30 
possess a Fourth Amendment right to expect that certain quan-
tities of information about them will remain private, even if 
they have no such expectations with respect to any of the dis-
crete particulars of that information.31 Thus, even if the use of a 
GPS-enabled tracking device to effect “relatively short-term 
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets” does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment, “the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on ex-
pectations of privacy.”32
According to critics and supporters alike, this quantitative 
account of Fourth Amendment privacy is revolutionary.
 
33 In his 
majority opinion in Jones, Justice Scalia describes some of the 
challenges and dangers.34 Foremost among these is the burden 
of explaining quantitative privacy’s Fourth Amendment pedi-
gree.35 A quantitative approach to the Fourth Amendment ap-
pears to undercut well-established rules, including the public 
observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine.36 Defenders 
of quantitative privacy must chart a conceptual link to these 
precedents or provide compelling reasons for changing course.37
 
 28. Id. at 948–49. 
 
Advocates also must provide a workable test that law enforce-
ment and courts can employ in drawing the line between quan-
tities of data that do and do not trigger the Fourth Amend-
 29. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concur-
ring). 
 30. We use “citizen” here and throughout this article in a generic, non-
technical sense, to refer to all persons who can assert Fourth Amendment 
rights and protections.  
 31. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In the pre-
computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional 
nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period 
of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken . . . . Devices 
like the [GPS-enabled tracking technology] used in the present case, however, 
make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”). 
 32. Id. at 964. 
 33. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2012). 
 34. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54. 
 35. Id. at 954. We answer this call in Part II. 
 36. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.D (analyzing the technology-centered ap-
proach alongside the public observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine). 
 37. We answer this demand in Part IV. 
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ment.38 This Article responds to these demands by engaging the 
Information Privacy Law Project.39
Although information privacy law and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence have a shared interest in defining and protecting 
privacy, with the exception of a few information privacy schol-
ars, these two fields have largely been treated as theoretically 
and practically discrete.
  
40 It is time to end that isolation and 
the mutual exceptionalism it implies. For nearly fifty years, 
scholars, activists, and policymakers working on information 
privacy law have warned about the dangers of surveillance 
technologies, including their capacity to chill projects of ethical 
self-development that are both core to our liberty interests and 
essential to a functioning democracy.41
As a protection afforded to “the people,” the Fourth 
Amendment erects a crucial constitutional bulwark against law 
enforcement’s tendency to engage in broader and ever more in-
trusive surveillance when officers and agencies are left to their 
own discretion.
 As we argue here, these 
concerns have clear Fourth Amendment salience and provide 
critical guidance as courts and legislatures search for ways to 
regulate emerging surveillance technologies in the shadow of 
Jones.  
42 As Justice Jackson pointed out in Johnson v. 
United States,43
 
 38. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. We describe and defend such a test infra 
Parts II and III. 
 law enforcement is a competitive enterprise in 
 39. Neil Richards coined this phrase to refer to the “collective effort by a 
group of scholars to identify a law of ‘information privacy’ and to establish in-
formation privacy law as a valid field of scholarly inquiry.” Neil M. Richards, 
The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1089 (2006) (book re-
view); see also PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SO-
CIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 197 (1995) (discussing information privacy 
policy entrepreneurs). 
 40. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF 
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, 
Transpareucy, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2008); Neil Richards, The 
Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
 41. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 
2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 3–4 (2007), available at http://stlr.stanford 
.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-principles.pdf; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democra-
cy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1610–16 (1999). 
 42. See Balkin, supra note 17, at 1, 19 (exploring the “enormous political 
pressure” on law enforcement to use advanced surveillance and data mining 
technologies); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (“[T]he larger purpose for which the Framers 
adopted the [Fourth Amendment was] to curb the exercise of discretionary au-
thority by officers.”). 
 43. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
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which government agents will seek any strategic advantage 
available to them.44 Pursuit of that advantage impels govern-
ment agents, even those acting with the best of intentions, to-
ward broader and more intrusive forms of surveillance.45 Our 
eighteenth-century forebears knew well the dangers of leaving 
these natural motivations unchecked.46 Before America’s found-
ing, British agents routinely abused general warrants, includ-
ing writs of assistance, to subject our forefathers to the eight-
eenth-century equivalent of a surveillance state.47 The Fourth 
Amendment responded to these abuses by limiting the right of 
law enforcement to effect physical searches and seizures and 
the authority of politically driven legislatures and executives to 
license programs of broad and indiscriminate search.48
Granting law enforcement unfettered access to twenty-first 
century surveillance technologies like aerial drones, DAS, and 
sweeping data collection efforts, implicates these same Fourth 
Amendment interests.
  
49 This does not mean that law enforce-
ment should be barred from conducting searches using modern 
surveillance technologies. Instead, in the present, as in the 
past,50 all that the Fourth Amendment requires is a set of poli-
cies and practices that limit the discretion of law enforcement, 
provide for meaningful judicial review, and effect a reasonable 
accommodation of both the legitimate interests of law enforce-
ment in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting crime, and the 
privacy interests of citizens subject to surveillance.51
 
 44. Id. at 14.  
 Here 
 45. Id. 
 46. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“But the forefa-
thers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to 
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they 
seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some 
criminals from punishment.”). 
 47. See infra Part II.C. 
 48. See Davies, supra note 42, at 655–60, 668. 
 49. Infra Parts III.B‒D (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of 
these technologies). 
 50. See generally Davies, supra note 42, at 578–80 (“Common-law authori-
ties repeatedly gave a consistent reason for condemning general warrants: if 
such warrants had been permitted, they would have conferred on ordinary of-
ficers discretionary authority to arrest or even to search houses. . . . Hostility 
to conferring discretionary search authority on common officers is also the 
theme of American complaints about the general writ of assistance.”). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must 
balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests 
alleged to justify the intrusion.”). 
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again, the work of information privacy law scholars offers im-
portant guidance in striking that balance.52
Until now, most proposals for defending Fourth Amend-
ment interests in quantitative privacy have focused on a case-
by-case method called the “mosaic theory.”
  
53 Under this ap-
proach, the Fourth Amendment is implicated whenever law en-
forcement officers gather “too much” information during the 
course of a specific investigation.54 Critics of the mosaic theory 
have rightly wondered how courts will determine whether in-
vestigators have gathered too much information in any given 
case and how officers in the midst of ongoing investigations will 
know whether the aggregate fruits of their efforts are ap-
proaching a Fourth Amendment boundary.55 The best solution 
that mosaic advocates have so far been able to muster is to 
draw bright, if arbitrary, lines based on how long officers use 
an investigative method or technology.56 These kinds of solu-
tions fail to satisfy because they are under inclusive, over in-
clusive, and also sidestep important conceptual and doctrinal 
questions.57
Rather than asking how much information is gathered in a 
particular case, we argue here that Fourth Amendment inter-
ests in quantitative privacy demand that we focus on how in-
formation is gathered. In our view, the threshold Fourth 
Amendment question should be whether a technology has the 
 We therefore propose an alternative.  
 
 52. See supra note 39. 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556–58 (2010) (as-
serting that the Knotts analysis is limited to the specific facts of the case); 
Kerr, supra note 33, at 311; Richard McAdams, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beep-
er Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 
340 (1985); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones 
in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 
DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2098002. See David 
Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and 
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 381 (2013), for our discussion of conceptual, doctrinal, and practical 
questions raised by the mosaic theory. 
 54. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; Gray & Citron, supra note 53, at 390. 
 55. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54; Gray & Citron, supra note 53, at 
408–11; Kerr, supra note 33, at 328–30. 
 56. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); Slobogin, 
supra note 53 (manuscript at 3, 28).  
 57. See Gray & Citron, supra note 53, at 426–28. Professor Slobogin 
acknowledges this concern, but nevertheless favors a regulatory scheme based 
on duration of surveillance for purposes of administrability. See Slobogin, su-
pra note 53 (manuscript at 28). 
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capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance that 
intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy 
by raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and 
use of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of law 
enforcement officers or other government agents.58 If it does 
not, then the Fourth Amendment imposes no limitations on law 
enforcement’s use of that technology, regardless of how much 
information officers gather against a particular target in a par-
ticular case.59 By contrast, if it does threaten reasonable expec-
tations of quantitative privacy, then the government’s use of 
that technology amounts to a “search,” and must be subjected 
to the crucible of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, including 
judicially enforced constraints on law enforcement’s discre-
tion.60
The form and timing of Fourth Amendment constraint un-
der our proposal would depend upon the technology at issue, 
the law enforcement interests it serves, and the privacy inter-
ests it threatens.
  
61 The most common way to implement Fourth 
Amendment regulations is to require officers to secure war-
rants from a detached and neutral magistrate before engaging 
in a search.62 For some technologies, that model will remain the 
best approach; but it is not the only alternative. Although ulti-
mate authority to review constitutional sufficiency must re-
main with the judiciary as a constitutional matter,63 our tech-
nology-centered approach allows for a range of more bespoke 
arrangements. For example, Congress might create a tailored 
regime along the lines of the Title III Wiretap Act.64
 
 58. In proposing a technology-based approach to quantitative privacy, we 
are inspired by the work of Susan Freiwald. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 
 Alterna-
41, 
¶ 9 (offering a technology-based approach to regulating government interfer-
ence with electronic communications). 
 59. The political branches would of course be free to impose extra-
constitutional limitations on the use of these investigative technologies. See 
infra Part III.B‒C. That the Fourth Amendment is silent would not at all 
prejudice the authority of the political branches to impose extra-constitutional 
limitations on the use of investigative technologies that do not implicate quan-
titative privacy. As we point out below, Congress has taken steps in the past to 
regulate the use of wiretaps and pen register devices after the Court declined 
to impose Fourth Amendment limitations on the use of these technologies. See 
infra notes 456–58 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948, 950.  
 61. See infra Part III. 
 62. See Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
904, 915‒16 (2004). 
 63. Balkin, supra note 17, at 23. 
 64. See Swire, supra note 62, at 923, 930.  
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tively, a law enforcement agency might collaborate with civil 
liberties groups and other interested parties to develop regula-
tions and administrative control structures65 similar to the con-
sent decrees that are often used to resolve constitutional chal-
lenges against police surveillance tactics and practices.66 As 
part of these efforts, designers and developers of surveillance 
technologies might incorporate constraints on the aggregation 
and retention of data along with use and access limitations, 
providing a set of Fourth Amendment pre-commitments that 
preserve law enforcement interests while minimizing threats to 
privacy.67
In what follows, we make the case for the right to quantita-
tive privacy and a technology-centered approach to protecting 
that right. Part I draws from the Information Privacy Law Pro-
ject to explain the threats to personality development, demo-
cratic participation, and accurate judgments posed by technolo-
gies capable of facilitating broad programs of indiscriminate 
surveillance. Part II explains the Fourth Amendment relevance 
of these concerns. Part III offers concrete proposals for protect-
ing Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy by 
considering how our technology-centered approach would apply 
to different kinds of surveillance technology. Part IV responds 
to objections and challenges. 
 
I.  QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY: THE PERILS OF BROAD AND 
INDISCRIMINATE SURVEILLANCE   
Although concerns about technology’s expanding capacities 
to gather and aggregate large quantities of data are new to 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, they have for decades been 
the focus of the Information Privacy Law Project, a long-
standing effort by scholars, practitioners, and activists to un-
derstand privacy, its importance to individuals and society, and 
law’s role in protecting it.68 As early as the 1960s, contributors 
to this project began raising concerns about the privacy impli-
cations of then-nascent computer databases.69
 
 65. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 
 Public and pri-
17, at 24 (suggesting that Congress can 
create a group in the Executive branch made up of independent privacy ex-
perts). 
 66. See, e.g., Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1389–92, 
1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 67. See infra Part III.C. 
 68. See sources cited supra note 39. 
 69. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158‒63 (1967) (dis-
cussing the “current pressures on privacy”). 
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vate entities had begun amassing computerized dossiers of 
people’s activities that armies of investigators could never have 
accumulated on their own.70 Businesses digitized employment, 
customer, and medical records; governments generated digital 
records on millions of Americans, including “subversives,” So-
cial Security participants, and public benefits recipients; and 
direct-mail companies categorized consumers and sold their 
personal information.71
Widespread public anxiety soon emerged about these “Big 
Brother” computer databases.
  
72 From 1965 through 1974, near-
ly fifty congressional hearings and reports investigated a range 
of data privacy issues, including the use of census records, ac-
cess to criminal history records, employers’ use of lie detector 
tests, and monitoring of political dissidents by the military and 
law enforcement.73 State and federal executives spearheaded 
investigations of surveillance technologies including a proposed 
National Databank Center.74 Popular culture and public dis-
course was consumed with the “data-bank problem.”75
This was not lost on the courts. In Whalen v. Roe,
  
76 a 1977 
case involving New York’s mandatory collection of prescription 
drug records, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the 
Constitution contains a right to information privacy based on 
substantive due process.77 Although it held that New York’s 
prescription drug database did not violate the constitutional 
right to privacy because the gathered information was ade-
quately secured, the Court recognized an “individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”78
 
 70. Id. 
 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Stevens noted the “threat to privacy implicit in 
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
 71. See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: 
COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY (1972) (detailing data practices 
of several organizations). Columbia University Professor of Public Law Alan 
Westin, serving as Director of the National Academy of Science’s Computer 
Science and Engineering Board, helped lead the study of governmental, com-
mercial, and private organizations using computers to amass dossiers on indi-
viduals, featuring fourteen case studies after visiting and interviewing fifty-
five organizations. Id. at 5. 
 72. See REGAN, supra note 39, at 13–15. 
 73. Id. at 7; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 71, at 4–5. 
 74. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 71, at 4–5. 
 75. See id.; REGAN, supra note 39, at 13.  
 76. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 77. Id. at 589, 598–600. 
 78. Id. at 599–600. 
  
2013] QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY 75 
 
computerized data banks or other massive government files.”79 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan warned that the “cen-
tral storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly 
increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am 
not prepared to say that future developments will not demon-
strate the necessity of some curb on such technology.”80
This century’s surveillance technologies pose far greater 
threats to privacy than the “Big Brother databanks” of the 
twentieth century. Information gathering is faster, cheaper, 
and more comprehensive than ever before.
 
81 Whereas infor-
mation gathered by public and private entities once tended to 
remain in information silos, it is now seamlessly shared with 
countless organizations via the Internet.82 Aggregation technol-
ogy and advanced statistical analysis tools have enhanced the 
capacities of those who wield surveillance technology to know 
us, often in ways that we do not know ourselves.83 Cheap data 
storage has virtually eliminated the privacy protections previ-
ously afforded by the possibility that past mistakes might be 
forgotten.84 Data broker databases, for instance, contain thou-
sands of data points about millions of individuals.85
Over the past fifty years, the Information Privacy Law Pro-
ject has highlighted the dangers posed by these “dataveillance” 
technologies and their ability to systematically amass infor-
mation about our daily lives.
  
86
 
 79. Id. at 605. 
 Scholars have paid particular at-
 80. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 81. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1459.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Balkin, supra note 17, at 12; TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., 
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, 36–37 (2004) 
[hereinafter TAPAC]. 
 84. Balkin, supra note 17, at 13–15. 
 85. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public 
and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 
246–48 (2007). Data brokers maintain websites custom-tailored for law en-
forcement that provide access to massive digital dossiers. As an internal doc-
ument from the United States Marshals Service notes, “With as little as a first 
name or a partial address, you can obtain a comprehensive personal profile in 
minutes” including Social Security numbers, known addresses, vehicle infor-
mation, telephone numbers, corporations, business affiliations, aircraft, boats, 
assets, professional licenses, concealed weapon permits, liens, lawsuits, mar-
riage licenses, and the like. Hoofnagle, supra note 24, at 596. Data brokers 
now combine that information with social media activity scrapped online, store 
purchases, and online surfing habits culled from online advertisers. 
 86. DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY 57–80 (1994). Roger Clarke offered the term “dataveillance” as a way 
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tention to the damaging effects of surveillance on life projects 
central to personal liberty, including individuals’ ethical explo-
ration, identity development, self-expression, and self-
actualization.87 As they have shown, government surveillance 
(or its possibility) causes people to internalize the notion of be-
ing watched, even if it is not actually happening,88 because 
“[p]otential knowledge can equal present power.”89 Government 
surveillance constrains “the acceptable spectrum of belief and 
behavior,” resulting in a “subtle yet fundamental shift in the 
content of our character.”90 People move towards the benign 
and mainstream, which threatens “not only to chill the expres-
sion of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen 
the force of our aspirations to it.”91
 
to conceptualize new forms of surveillance facilitated by the widespread use of 
computer-based technology. Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and 
Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498, 499, 502–04 (1988). Clarke identified two 
forms of dataveillance: (1) personal dataveillance, which involves identifiable 
persons who by their actions have attracted the attention of the panoptic sys-
tem, and (2) mass dataveillance, which refers to gathering of data about 
groups of people with the intention of finding individuals requiring attention. 
 In the face of broad and in-
 87. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 108 (2008) [hereinafter 
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING]; Cohen, supra note 40, at 194–97; TAPAC, supra 
note 83, at 35 (“Awareness that the government may, without probable cause 
or other specific authorization, obtain access to myriad, distributed stores of 
information about an individual may alter his or her behavior. People are like-
ly to act differently if they know their conduct could be observed.”); see DANIEL 
J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE 44–47 (2004) (discussing the causes of self-censoring) [hereinafter 
SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON]. Studies have shown that people experience anxiety 
about being watched and misunderstood. Stuart A. Karabenick & John R. 
Knapp, Effects of Computer Privacy on Help-Seeking, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 461 (1988). 
 88. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 87, at 109; Neil M. Richards, 
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403–04 (2008). See also GEORGE 
ORWELL, 1984 at 4 (1949) (“There was of course no way of knowing whether 
you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, 
the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was 
even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate 
they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live—did 
live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you 
made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinised.”). 
 89. TAPAC, supra note 83, at 35.  
 90. Julie E. Cohen, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND 
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 141 (2012); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: In-
formational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425–26 
(2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined]. 
 91. Cohen, Examined, supra note 90, at 1426. See also Hubert H. Humph-
rey, Foreword to EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS, at viii (1967) (“We act dif-
ferently if we believe we are being observed. If we can never be sure whether 
or not we are being watched and listened to, all our actions will be altered and 
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discriminate data collection about their daily activities, indi-
viduals cannot make meaningful choices about their activities, 
preferences, and relations and act on them without fear of em-
barrassment or recrimination.92 Individual development and 
expression are inevitably chilled.93
The Information Privacy Project has also warned about the 
stakes of broad and indiscriminate surveillance for a healthy 
democracy.
  
94 Privacy preserves space for engaging in the criti-
cal functions of citizenship.95 Self-rule requires a “group-
oriented process of critical discourse” among autonomous indi-
viduals.96
 
our very character will change.”); TAPAC, supra note 
 The persistent logging of our online activities and of-
83, at 35–36 (“The 
greatest risk of government data mining is that access to individually identifi-
able data chills individual behavior . . . changing the legal behavior of U.S. 
persons, encouraging conformance with a perceived norm, discouraging politi-
cal dissent, or otherwise altering participation in political life.”). 
 92. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 17 
(2011); see Gary T. Marx, Identity and Anonymity: Some Conceptual Distinc-
tions and Issues for Research, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 311, 
316, 318 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001) (discussing the benefits of 
anonymity). Aside from the consequential effects of surveillance technologies, 
privacy scholars also emphasize deontological concerns, notably that surveil-
lance technologies demonstrates a lack of respect for its subject as an autono-
mous person. Stanley Benn explains that being “an object of scrutiny, as the 
focus of another’s attention, brings one to a new consciousness of oneself, as 
something seen through another’s eyes.” Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, 
and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 1, 7 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1971). The observed person sees herself as a knowable 
object, with “limited possibilities rather than infinite, indeterminate possibili-
ties.” Id. Covert surveillance is problematic because it “deliberately deceives a 
person about his world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his reasons, his 
attempts to make a rational choice.” Id. at 10. 
 93. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 143‒44 (2007); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: 
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. 
L.J. 213, 253–55 (2002). As Justice William O. Douglas observed, 
“[m]onitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous ut-
terances.” United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).  
 94. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 17, at 17–18.  
 95. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 3–5, 15–17, 66–74 (2005); 
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 350 (1996) (discussing a democratic role for privately ne-
gotiated identities); Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth 
Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2009).  
 96. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information 
and the Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 
560–61 (1995); see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 35–36. Paul Schwartz has 
relied on the work of constitutional theorist James E. Fleming in arguing that 
democracy in general and constitutional law in particular must secure the 
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fline travels interferes with civic participation and delibera-
tion.97 As Spiros Simitis cautions, “neither freedom of speech 
nor freedom of association nor freedom of assembly can be fully 
exercised as long as it remains uncertain whether, under what 
circumstances, and for what purposes, personal information is 
collected and processed.”98 For these reasons, privacy advocates 
have pressed for laws that can prevent “state or community in-
timidation that would destroy their involvement in the demo-
cratic life of the community.”99 In their view, “privacy in public” 
is indispensable for a functioning democratic society.100
 
preconditions for “‘citizens to apply their capacity for a conception of the good 
to deliberat[ions] about . . . how to live their own lives.’” Schwartz, supra note 
  
41, at 1654 (quoting James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1995)). Fleming calls for a deliberative autonomy that is 
based on moral autonomy, responsibility, and independence. James E. Flem-
ing, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–34 (1995). 
 97. Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Ro-
bust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822 (2010). What’s more, a 
troubling power imbalance emerges between individuals and the entities that 
amass their information. Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, HARV. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 28), available at http://www 
.harvardlawreview.org/symposium/papers2012/richards.pdf. Individuals be-
come vulnerable to the whims of powerful entities. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, 
supra note 87, at 44–47. During the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights, antiwar, 
and communist activists included on the FBI’s “suspicious persons list” lost 
jobs, work opportunities, and licenses, while labor union organizers assumed 
new names and Social Security numbers due to fierce hostility to union mem-
bers. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 71, at 40, 41 (noting that in 1972 the 
Social Security Agency (SSA) permitted individuals to assume different identi-
ties and new Social Security numbers so that they could avoid prejudice due to 
their group affiliations); see, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose 
Security? The USA Patriot Act in the Context of Cointelpro and the Unlawful 
Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1080–98 (2002) (detailing 
and criticizing the FBI's COINTELPRO domestic surveillance program of the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s). 
 98. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 707, 734 (1987); see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 34 (explaining 
that “awareness that the government may, without individual consent or judi-
cial authorization, obtain access to myriad, distributed stores of information 
about an individual may have a chilling effect on commercial, social, and polit-
ical activity. Informational privacy is, therefore, linked to other civil liberties, 
including freedom of expression, association, and religion”).  
 99. Schwartz, supra note 96, at 561. This is not to suggest that the sur-
veillance of groups is justiciable, although it may be in circumstances where 
the chilling of expressive association is accompanied by objective harm, such 
as reputational damage. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (refus-
ing to find justiciable constitutional violation for army’s data gathering about 
political group because allegations of “subjective ‘chill’” based on possibility 
that army may “at some future date misuse the information” are “not an ade-
quate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of 
specific future harm”); see also Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Associa-
  
2013] QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY 79 
 
This is not to say that citizens subjected to invasive sur-
veillance inevitably withdraw from democratic engagement. 
They may engage in productive resistance101 or disregard sur-
veillance’s risks on the view that they have nothing to hide.102 
Nonetheless, the impulse to self-censor is strong when people 
have no idea who is watching them and how their information 
will be used.103 This is all the more true for traditionally subor-
dinated groups in our post-9/11 age.104 Because racial, ethnic, 
and religious minorities are particularly vulnerable to govern-
mental suspicion and profiling, they are more likely to refrain 
from both exploring their own conceptions of the good life and 
participating robustly in public life when they are subjected to 
surveillance.105
 
tion: Political Profiling, Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 621, 656–57 (2004).  
 The burden of self-censorship occasioned by a 
surveillance state is thus borne unequally. At any rate, demo-
cratic participation just should not require heroic levels of civic 
courage—such a requirement is both contrary to our constitu-
 100. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 17, at 18; TAPAC, supra note 83, at 36 
(“For two hundred years Americans have proudly distrusted their government. 
The risk, therefore, of the power to access data from disparate sources is not 
merely to informational privacy, but to civil liberties including freedom of ex-
pression, association, and religion.”).  
 101. Kevin D. Haggerty, Tear Down the Walls: On Demolishing the Panop-
ticon, in THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND 23, 34–35 
(David Lyon ed., 2006). 
 102. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 1. 
 103. As Frank Pembleton, portrayed by Andre Braugher in the NBC serial 
Homicide: Life on the Street, put the point: “[I]f you feel like you’re being 
watched, you do what you’re told, especially when you’re being watched by 
someone you can’t see.” Homicide: Life on the Street: Fits Like a Glove (NBC 
television broadcast Oct. 21, 1994). 
 104. For example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme 
Court upheld a content-based restriction of speech for offering material sup-
port to state-identified terrorist organizations, even if the money was given for 
humanitarian efforts. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729–31 (2010).  
 105. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Net-
worked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 741, 760–64 (2008) (noting that relational surveillance can “chill 
tentative associations and experimentation with various group identities); see 
also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 22, 
134–54, 158–60, 219 (2003) (exploring the problematic nature of predictive 
models when cued by race and gender because they are overused as markers of 
difference in morally problematic ways). One might argue that private entities 
also have the capacity to suppress by surveillance. We address these concerns 
infra Part IV.C‒D. 
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tional scheme106 and an undue burden on citizens of a free and 
democratic society.107
Courts operating in the information privacy context have 
echoed concerns that broad and indiscriminate surveillance 
threatens liberty interests.
  
108 For instance, in Nader v. General 
Motors Corp.,109 General Motors undertook a campaign to dis-
credit and intimidate its well-recognized critic Ralph Nader. 
The company placed him under extensive public surveillance 
and tapped his telephone.110 In 1970, the New York Court of 
Appeals recognized that, although observing others in public 
places generally does not constitute a tort, sometimes “surveil-
lance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable.”111 As 
the court explained, “[a] person does not automatically make 
public everything he does merely by being in a public place, and 
the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the 
right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdraw-
ing.”112
The Information Privacy Law Project has also highlighted 
problems caused by incorrect or incomplete information 
amassed in databases.
  
113 In an early case confronting these is-
sues, United States District Judge Gerhard Gesell ordered the 
FBI to refrain from disseminating computerized criminal rec-
ords for state and local employment and license checks, because 
the records were often inaccurate and hence “clearly invade[d] 
individual privacy.”114 The court warned of ever more inaccura-
cies in databases with the “development of centralized state in-
formation centers to be linked by computer to the Bureau.”115
Experience has shown that Judge Gesell’s concerns were 
well founded. In recent years, employers have refused to inter-
view or hire individuals based on incorrect or misleading per-
  
 
 106. TAPAC, supra note 83, at 36. 
 107. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 
815, 837 (2000). 
 108. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 73–77 (Cal. 1999) 
(finding that a television show invaded an employee’s privacy by secretly vide-
otaping his workplace conversations even though other employees could hear 
him because employee should not reasonably expect to be secretly recorded by 
journalists). 
 109. 255 N.E. 2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 771. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See TAPAC, supra note 83, at 37–39. 
 114. United States v. Menard, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 115. Id. at 727. 
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sonal information obtained through surveillance technologies.116 
Governmental data-mining systems have flagged innocent in-
dividuals as persons of interest, leading to their erroneous clas-
sifications as terrorists or security threats, intense scrutiny at 
airports, denial of travel, false arrest, and loss of public bene-
fits.117 The potential for damage is magnified by our “infor-
mation sharing environment,” which facilitates the distribution 
of such designations with countless public and private actors, 
compounding the error in ways that are difficult to detect and 
eliminate.118
Consider the distortions generated by fusion centers that 
gather intelligence on “all hazards, all crimes, and all 
threats.”
  
119 In one case, Maryland state police exploited their 
access to fusion centers to conduct surveillance of human rights 
groups, peace activists, and death penalty opponents over a 
nineteen-month period.120 Fifty-three political activists eventu-
ally were classified as “terrorists,” including two Catholic nuns 
and a Democratic candidate for local office.121 The fusion center 
shared these erroneous terrorist classifications with federal 
drug enforcement, law enforcement databases, and the Nation-
al Security Administration, all without affording the innocent 
targets any opportunity to know, much less correct, the rec-
ord.122
 
 116. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 
  
87, at 46–47. Only in exception-
al cases do individuals discover their digital dossiers contain erroneous infor-
mation about them. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1816 n.82 (2010). 
 117. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1273–77 (2008) (exploring inaccuracies of automated decision-
making governmental systems including “No Fly,” public benefits, and “dead 
beat” parent matching systems). 
 118. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1443 (describing data inaccuracy 
risks, including those linked to data integration attempts). Federal agencies, 
including the Department of Homeland Security, gather information in con-
junction with state and local law enforcement officials in what Congress has 
deemed the “information sharing environment” (ISE). Id. The ISE is essential-
ly a network; its hubs are fusion centers whose federal and state analysts col-
lect, analyze, and share intelligence. Id; see TAPAC, supra note 83, at 37–39. 
 119. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1450. 
 120. Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2008, at A1. 
 121. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1462. 
 122. Madigan, supra note 120. The ACLU found out about the erroneous 
classifications by sheer luck. After activists shared their concerns about being 
watched at meetings, it filed open sunshine requests, which eventually yielded 
information about the monitoring and the fusion center’s involvement. Once 
the press covered the story, the state Attorney General initiated an investiga-
tion of the matter, exposing detailed information about the abuse. Danielle 
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The dangers of powerful data aggregation and analysis 
technologies are not limited to mistakes, of course. If anything, 
the threats to liberty and democratic culture are more profound 
if they are accurate. On this point, Jack Balkin has argued 
that, “Government’s most important technique of control is no 
longer watching or threatening to watch. It is analyzing and 
drawing connections between data.”123 What is collected need 
not be particularly intimate or private, he continues; rather, 
“data mining technologies allow the state and business enter-
prises to record perfectly innocent behavior that no one is par-
ticularly ashamed of and draw surprisingly powerful inferences 
about people’s behavior, beliefs, and attitudes.”124 From this 
level of surveillance, he concludes, government dominance and 
control follows.125
Work done in the information privacy law context provides 
ample evidence that programs of broad and indiscriminate sur-
veillance threaten fundamental liberty interests and democrat-
ic values. Despite the critical role played by privacy concepts in 
contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine, however, there has 
been little interdisciplinary engagement between the Infor-
mation Privacy Law Project and Fourth Amendment law and 
scholarship. The Court’s decision in United States v. Jones
 
126
 
Keats Citron, COINTELPRO in a Digital World, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 
11, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/10/ 
cointelpro_in_a.html. 
 
invites us to end that isolation. The next Part accepts that invi-
tation.  
 123. Balkin, supra note 17, at 12. This point draws on the work of Michel 
Foucault who extended Bentham’s insights to describe how a whole range of 
public institutions use surveillance to shape subjects who internalize the 
norms and priorities of the institutions in which they are situated. MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195–308 (1975); see also MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE 
OF REASON (1961). 
 124. Balkin, supra note 17, at 12. See also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 39–40 
(describing how innocuous information, such as special meal requests made to 
an airline, can be misused by government surveillance programs to identify 
and target individuals based on religious affiliation). 
 125. Balkin, supra note 17, at 12–15. 
 126. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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II.  QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT   
In a landmark near-decision, the Supreme Court almost 
held in United States v. Jones127 that citizens have a Fourth 
Amendment interest in quantitative privacy. Although resolved 
on narrow grounds, five Justices raised concerns in Jones about 
the capacity of surveillance technologies to gather large quanti-
ties of data that reveal personal details about our lives.128 In the 
wake of Jones, critics and skeptics of this quantitative account 
of Fourth Amendment privacy have leveled charges of doctrinal 
radicalism and impracticality.129
A. QUALITATIVE PRIVACY: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BEFORE 
UNITED STATES V. JONES 
 In this Part and the next we 
draw on insights from the Information Privacy Law Project to 
meet these challenges. We begin with a brief history of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to put Jones in context.  
Although not specified in the text,130 for at least a century 
after the Fourth Amendment was ratified, courts defined 
“search” in reference to concepts of common law trespass.131 As 
a consequence, Fourth Amendment rights were linked to prop-
erty rights and Fourth Amendment remedies were limited to 
suits in tort.132 That changed in the twentieth century with in-
creased urbanization, emerging transportation and communi-
cation technologies, and the expansion of professionalized po-
lice forces.133 Olmstead v. United States134 marks the beginning 
of the shift.135
 
 127. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
  
 128. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 129. Kerr, supra note 33, at 314–15, 346–52. 
 130. The Fourth Amendment provides that: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
 131. Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3–4. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious His-
tory of Fourth Amendment Searches, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manu-
script at 2) (arguing that the trespass test of Fourth Amendment search is a 
myth created by the Court in Katz (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967))), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ 
ID2169926_code810317.pdf?abstractid=2154611&mirid=1.  
 132. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 786 (1994).  
 133. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471‒79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
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Writing for a five-justice majority in Olmstead, Chief Jus-
tice Taft held that intercepting telephone conversations was not 
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment because the technolo-
gy used did not require any physical invasion of Olmstead’s 
home.136 In a spirited dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that this 
property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment was anach-
ronistic.137 As Justice Brandeis explained, it failed to protect cit-
izens from procedures that might not require the “force and vio-
lence” necessary to invade property, but nevertheless 
compromised the sanctity of citizens’ thoughts, beliefs, and 
emotions as well as the “individual security” they invested in 
activities like telephone conversations.138
Nearly four decades later, Justice Brandeis’s view pre-
vailed in Katz v. United States.
  
139 There, the Court held that us-
ing a listening device to monitor telephone conversations in a 
public phone booth constituted a Fourth Amendment “search” 
despite the absence of a physical intrusion.140 In rejecting the 
trespass requirement, the Court famously declared that, “the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”141 The Court 
found that conversations in public telephone booths deserve 
Fourth Amendment protection because citizens expect that 
their telephone conversations are just as secure from public re-
view as their daily domestic routines in the home.142
 
dissenting); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Proce-
dure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 460‒61 (2010); see also DAVID R. 
JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD 4–9, 29–40 (1979). 
 Although 
phone booths are open to public view, the Court noted that they 
 134. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
 135. Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and 
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 423–24 (2007). 
 136. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
 137. Id. at 473–74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’ dissent 
came as no surprise to students of his groundbreaking article, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which he co-wrote with Samuel D. War-
ren. 
 138. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–74, 478–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[The 
Framers] recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings 
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis-
factions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Amer-
icans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.”). 
 139. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 140. Id. at 353, 358‒59. 
 141. Id. at 351. 
 142. Id. at 351–52. 
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function as spaces of aural repose.143 Thus, citizens could rea-
sonably expect that their communications in telephone booths 
would not be monitored by “uninvited ear[s],” even if they can 
be seen by “intruding eye[s].”144 The other alternative—
declining to extend Fourth Amendment protection at all—
would unsettle these broadly held expectations and raise the 
specter of a surveillance state.145
After Katz, determining whether government conduct con-
stitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” has turned on whether 
the person claiming a violation subjectively manifests an expec-
tation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable.
  
146 Of course, we enjoy a broader range of reasonable 
privacy expectations in some places than in others.147 For ex-
ample, we harbor strong expectations of privacy in our homes, 
persons, and immediate possessions.148 By contrast, as the 
Court has ruled, we have no reason to expect privacy in activi-
ties we “knowingly expose[] to the public.”149 Between these 
endpoints, we have “diminished” expectations of privacy in our 
cars150 and businesses151 because our activities in these spaces 
are often, but not always, exposed to the public or to regulators. 
Under the Katz test, however, the key question in Fourth 
Amendment cases is not where a search occurs, but whether 
and to what degree it invades reasonable expectations of priva-
cy.152
 
 143. Id. 
 This is the qualitative approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
 144. Id. at 352. 
 145. Id. at 354–59 (interposing a warrant requirement for electronic eaves-
dropping and emphasizing that “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to 
know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
government agents here ignored ‘the procedure of antecedent justification . . . 
that is central to the Fourth Amendment,’ a procedure that we hold to be a 
constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in 
this case”). 
 146. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
 147. Slobogin, supra note 53, at 5–7. 
 148. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (discussing the 
strong expectation of privacy in one’s home); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (mention-
ing “persons, houses, papers, and effects” as being specifically protected from 
unwarranted searches and seizures). 
 149. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 150. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 304–05 (1999). 
 151. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987). 
 152. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360‒61 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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 Applying this qualitative approach, the Court has formu-
lated two important legal doctrines that are implicated by 
United States v. Jones. First, establishing what is known as the 
“public observation doctrine,” the Court has held that law en-
forcement officers can freely make observations from any place 
where they lawfully have a right to be.153 Police officers thus 
may stand on the street and observe us through open windows, 
look down on us from public airspace,154 and monitor our 
movements on public roads.155 Officers may also use devices 
such as binoculars, telephoto lenses,156 and beeper-type track-
ers157
Second, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment 
cannot save us from “misplaced confidence” in third parties.
 to enhance their observational abilities.  
158 
Even if we avoid public exposure by only sharing our private 
activities with a select few, we run the risk that those people 
will violate our trust by sharing the details with law enforce-
ment.159 Applying this “third-party doctrine,” the Court has 
held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the gov-
ernment from lawfully obtaining privately recorded conversa-
tions that are disclosed by the recording party,160 a list of num-
bers dialed from a customer’s telephone that is obtained by the 
telephone company using a “pen register,”161 or lists of financial 
transactions passed along by a customer’s bank.162 Part of the 
reason why critics dismiss the quantitative approach to privacy 
articulated in the Jones concurrences is because it appears to 
threaten both the public observation doctrine and the third 
party doctrine.163
 
 153. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989). 
  
 154. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
 155. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
 156. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 251 (1986). 
 157. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82. 
 158. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 777 (1971); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
 159. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561 (2009) (describing Supreme Court cases rejecting Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to evidence gathered from undercover agents and confidential 
informants). 
 160. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963); see also United 
States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 366–67 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 161. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979). 
 162. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). As Part IV discusses, 
Congress passed legislation to protect the privacy interests in the contents of 
bank records that are not reached by the Fourth Amendment. 
 163. See infra Part IV.B–D. 
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B. A FOURTH AMENDMENT FOOTHOLD FOR QUANTITATIVE 
PRIVACY IN UNITED STATES V. JONES 
In United States v. Jones, an inter-agency group of law en-
forcement officers suspected that Jones was a high-level partic-
ipant in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics in and around the 
District of Columbia.164 Jones was cautious, however, which 
prevented officers from developing enough direct evidence to 
justify his arrest and prosecution.165 Fortunately for them, of-
ficers had enough evidence to apply for warrants allowing them 
to “tap” his telephone and to monitor his movements with a 
GPS device attached to his Jeep.166 These efforts produced sev-
eral incriminating statements and over 2000 pages of tracking 
data showing that Jones made regular visits to stash houses 
and other locations tied to the broader drug conspiracy during 
the twenty-eight day monitoring period.167 Unfortunately, the 
officers violated the terms of their tracking warrant when in-
stalling the GPS device, which left the door open for Jones to 
object to the introduction of this evidence at trial.168
Relying on the public observation doctrine, the trial court 
denied Jones’s motion to suppress.
  
169 Jones subsequently was 
convicted, in part based upon the GPS data, which provided a 
critical link between him and the alleged drug conspiracy.170 On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed.171 Writing for the panel, Judge 
Ginsburg argued that there is a Fourth Amendment distinction 
between short-term and long-term monitoring.172
 
 164. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 Although 
movements in public can be observed in discrete time slices by 
anyone—including law enforcement—Judge Ginsburg pointed 
out that “the whole of one’s movements over the course of a 
 165. See id. (describing how Government relied on evidence from GPS de-
vice to obtain Jones’ indictment and conviction). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 948–49. 
 168. Id. The GPS tracking warrant issued by the district court required 
that the officers install the device on the car registered to Jones’ wife within 
ten days of the date on the warrant at any location within the borders of the 
District of Columbia. Id. Unfortunately, the officers installed the device on the 
eleventh day and in a suburban Maryland parking lot. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 949.  
 171. Id. 
 172. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556–57 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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month is not actually exposed to the public because the likeli-
hood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively 
nil.”173
Judge Ginsburg further explained that law enforcement’s 
monitoring of a single trip to the store does not reveal much 
about the target; but that monitoring “the whole of one’s 
movements”
  
174 by contrast paints “an intimate picture of [one’s] 
life.”175 Because we have no reason to believe that we are under 
constant surveillance by any particular person or entity,176 and 
out of respect for the privacy we invest in the totality of our 
public movements, Judge Ginsburg concluded that we enjoy a 
reasonable expectation that we will be free from constant gov-
ernment surveillance as well.177 For these reasons, the circuit 
court vacated Jones’s conviction,178
 
 173. Id. at 558 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 563 (“A reasonable 
person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time he 
drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he stops 
and how long he stays there; rather, he expects, each of those movements to 
remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’”). 
 holding that, although Jones 
 174. Id. at 558.  
 175. Id. at 562; see also id. (“The difference is not one of degree, but of kind, 
for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction 
between a day in the life and a way of like, nor the departure from a routine 
that, like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal 
even more.”); id. at 563 (“[P]rolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate pic-
ture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have—short perhaps of his 
spouse.”). 
 176. In an analogous way, state harassment laws and privacy tort law have 
reinforced the notion that people can expect to be free from unreasonable sur-
veillance. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(upholding injunction against a persistent paparazzo); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 
F. Supp. 1413, 1420, 1433–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining surveillance of a fami-
ly on the grounds it was part of “a persistent course of hounding, harassment 
and unreasonable surveillance, even if conducted in a public or semi-public 
place”).  
 177. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 (holding that the public observation 
doctrine provides “only that ‘a person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another,’ not that such a person has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end” (quoting United 
States v. Knotts, 160 U.S. 276, 281 (1983))). 
 178. According to its decretal paragraph, the court “reversed” Jones’s con-
viction, but one assumes that the court intended to leave open the possibility 
of a retrial if the government chose to retry Jones without evidence obtained 
by the GPS-enabled monitoring. See, e.g., id. at 568 (“To be sure, absent the 
GPS data a jury reasonably might have inferred Jones was involved in the 
conspiracy.”). The government did indeed retry Jones without the GPS data, 
resulting in a mistrial. Id. The jury was deadlocked. David Kravets, Alleged 
Drug Dealer at Center of Supreme Court GPS Case Wins Mistrial, WIRED, 
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lacked a discrete Fourth Amendment interest in most of his in-
dividual public movements, he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the total quantity of “his movements over the course 
of a month,” which was “defeated” by law enforcement’s “use of 
the GPS device.”179
The Supreme Court affirmed unanimously.
  
180 The Court’s 
opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts with Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, held 
that the installation of the GPS device on Jones’s car involved a 
search because it was accomplished by a trespass for the pur-
pose of obtaining information.181 Although the investigating of-
ficers had a warrant, they violated its terms, rendering the in-
stallation unreasonable.182 The majority left for another day the 
question of whether monitoring of Jones’s movements using the 
GPS device raised any additional Fourth Amendment issues.183 
The concurring opinions, however, left little doubt about which 
view the Court will take when that day comes.184
For himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, 
Justice Alito concurred in Jones to express his skepticism of the 
majority’s trespass-based holding and his preference for a 
quantitative approach to evaluating Fourth Amendment priva-
  
 
Mar. 4, 2013, available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/03/gps-drug 
-dealer-retrial/. In May 2013 Jones Agreed to a plea deal with prosecutors for a 
15 year sentence with credit for time served. Nick Anderson & Anne E. 
Marimow, Former D.C. Nightclub Owner Antoine Jones Sentenced on Drug 
Charge, WASH. POST, May 1, 2013, http://failover.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
antoine-jones-pleads-guilty-to-drug-charge/2013/05/01/1109c268-b274-11e2 
-bbf2-a6f9e9d79e19_story.html. 
 179. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
 180. Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
 181. Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (“When the Government does engage in a physical intru-
sion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that 
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). During the 
October 2012 term, the Court confirmed its commitment to preserving physi-
cal intrusion as a baseline for determining whether law enforcement conduct 
constitutes a “search.” See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). 
 182. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566–67. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 
10, 13–14 (1948) (holding that, absent emergency or other exceptional circum-
stance, the Fourth Amendment requires that determinations of reasonable-
ness be made by a judicial officer rather than “zealous officers” who are “en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”). Judge 
Kavanaugh proposed trespass as a narrower ground for decision in his dissent 
from the Circuit Court’s denial of the petition for rehearing en banc. See Unit-
ed States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71 (2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 183. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 184. Id. at 954‒64. 
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cy interests in the face of new surveillance technologies.185 For 
Justice Alito, the driving concern raised by emerging surveil-
lance technologies is scale.186 “In the pre-computer age,” he 
points out, “the greatest protections of privacy were neither 
constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”187 Long-term sur-
veillance by traditional means was logistically difficult and 
prohibitively expensive.188 Its rarity provided citizens with good 
reason to expect that they would generally be free from surveil-
lance, and could enjoy a substantial degree of anonymity in the 
aggregate of their public activities.189 Although “short-term 
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords 
with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as 
reasonable,” Justice Alito would have held that “longer term 
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”190
Courts and scholars have described the case-by-case meth-
od of evaluating quantitative privacy advocated by Judge Gins-
burg and Justice Alito as the “mosaic” theory.
  
191 The critical 
question under this approach is whether the collection of per-
sonal information aggregated by officers during a given investi-
gation violates reasonable expectations of privacy. Responding 
to that question on the record before him in Jones, Justice Alito 
declined to “identify with precision the point at which the 
tracking of [Jones’s] vehicle became a search,” but thought it 
clear that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week 
mark.”192
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence in Jones 
to express her support for the majority’s ruling and her sympa-
  
 
 185. Id. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 186. Id. at 963‒64. 
 187. Id. at 963. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 963–64. See also Hutchins, supra note 135, at 455–56. 
 190. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Stephen E. 
Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine 
of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 547–48 (2005). 
 191. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
aff’d, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Kerr, supra note 33, at 
313. The term “mosaic” is borrowed from national security law, where the 
Government has defended against requests made under the Freedom of In-
formation Act on the grounds that when otherwise innocuous intelligence in-
formation is aggregated it can reveal secret methods and sources. See general-
ly David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005). 
 192. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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thy with Justice Alito’s quantitative approach to Fourth 
Amendment privacy.193 In terms familiar to information privacy 
law scholars, she explained that “GPS monitoring generates a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements 
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, pro-
fessional, religious, and sexual associations.”194 Because it 
“mak[es] available at a relatively low cost such a substantial 
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the 
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,” she 
worried that it is “susceptible to abuse.”195
Further, and echoing concerns expressed by the Infor-
mation Privacy Law Project, Justice Sotomayor was troubled 
that broad deployment of modern tracking technology would 
“chill[] associational and expressive freedoms,” while “alter[ing] 
‘the relationship between citizen and government in a way that 
is inimical to a democratic society.’”
  
196 In addition to modifying 
the public observation doctrine, Justice Sotomayor suggested 
that providing full protection for Fourth Amendment interests 
in quantitative privacy may also require “reconsider[ing]” the 
third-party doctrine to prevent the government from simply us-
ing private agents to conduct indirectly surveillance that it 
cannot pursue directly.197
The worries expressed by the concurring Justices in Jones 
resonate strongly with work done by information privacy law 
scholars that explains the value of quantitative privacy for lib-
erty and democracy.
  
198 Although there have until now been very 
few connections drawn between information privacy law and 
Fourth Amendment theory and doctrine, the concurring opin-
ions in Jones suggest that these days of isolation are over.199 
There is, of course, a considerable amount of work that remains 
to be done.200
 
 193. Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 Among the many challenges issued by critics on 
 194. Id. at 955. 
 195. Id. at 956. 
 196. Id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 
640 F.3d 272, 286 (2011)); see also Richards, supra note 39, at 1087, 1102–03. 
 197. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See generally 
Mary Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones—Commercial 
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 331 (2012) (arguing for legislation constraining private enti-
ties from gathering and analyzing personal data). 
 198. Richards, supra note 40, at 1935, 1945‒49; Leary, supra note 197, at 
351‒54. 
 199. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954‒64. 
 200. See generally Kerr, supra note 33, 328‒43. 
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and off the Court is whether quantitative privacy and the in-
terests it protects have real Fourth Amendment salience.201
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTITATIVE 
PRIVACY 
 We 
answer that challenge in the next section.  
Although the value placed in quantitative privacy by in-
formation privacy law scholars, practitioners, and advocates 
has not yet played a prominent role in Fourth Amendment doc-
trine, the foundations are there.202 The Fourth Amendment was 
conceived, and has long served, as a bulwark against law en-
forcement’s teleological tendency toward a surveillance state.203 
So too does the Fourth Amendment—on its own and in a 
broader constitutional context—treat privacy as essential to 
liberty and a functioning democracy.204 Together, these estab-
lished Fourth Amendment values provide ample ground for ex-
tending Fourth Amendment protections to cover reasonable ex-
pectations of quantitative privacy.205
Like many provisions in the Bill of Rights,
  
206 the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and its limitations on warrants have a reactionary origin 
story.207 The core text of the Constitution does not provide for 
individual rights.208 Although this omission was criticized dur-
ing the drafting process,209
 
 201. Id. at 315, 343–45.  
 it received particular attention dur-
 202. See generally Richards, supra note 39. 
 203. Davies, supra note 42, at 590 (arguing that the framers’ target when 
adopting the Fourth Amendment was broad and indiscriminate search pro-
grams granting unbounded discretion to executive agents, including general 
warrants, which “undermine the right of security in person and house”). 
 204. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 303, 340–45 (2010). 
 205. Cf. Leary, supra note 197, at 351‒54 (stating legislative protections for 
quantitative privacy should be enacted).  
 206. Davies, supra note 42, at 673. 
 207. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 13, 51–78 (1937); Thomas R. Clancy, The Framers’ In-
tent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 980 
(2011); Davies, supra note 42, at 561‒67, 673‒74. 
 208. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 83. 
 209. See, e.g., id. at 84–86; George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of 
Government Formed by the Convention 1–2 (1787) (unpublished manuscript) 
available at http://virginiamemory.com/docs/hires/masonobjections/pdf (com-
plaining about the absence of a “Declaration of Rights” in the Constitution and 
expressing concerns that this omission would effectively moot the declarations 
of rights found in the constitutions of the states). 
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ing ratification when state legislatures raised concerns about 
the tyrannical potential of a strong federal government.210 Their 
fears were not abstract.211 Members of these legislatures and 
their constituents still bore the scars of constraint and disfavor 
at the hands of the Crown and shared a common law con-
sciousness shadowed by the Star Chamber and the torturous 
abuses of the Tower and the Church.212 It was against these ar-
chetypes of tyranny that the Bill of Rights was drafted and 
adopted.213
The Fourth Amendment drew on these historical experi-
ences to describe limitations on “the amount of power that [our 
society] permits its police to use without effective control by 
law.”
 
214 During the colonial period, British officials and their 
representatives took advantage of writs of assistance and other 
general warrants, which immunized them from legal liability 
for their invasions,215 in order to search anyone they pleased, 
anywhere they pleased, without having to specify cause or rea-
son.216
 
 210. See LASSON, supra note 
 James Otis, who famously vacated his office as Advocate 
207, at 83, 87–97; Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 400 (1974) (“To 
be sure, the framers appreciated the need for a powerful central government. 
But they also feared what a powerful central government might bring, not on-
ly to the jeopardy of the states but to the terror of the individual.”); Clancy, 
supra note 207, at 1034–36. 
 211. LASSON, supra note 207, at 13, 51‒78.  
 212. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 24–28, 32; Clancy, supra note 207, at 
981, 103–44; c.f. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313 (1967) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (discussing historical abuses of writs); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 
62 n.15 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 
360, 375 (1959) (same).  
 213. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 13–50; Clancy, supra note 207, at 
1002–04. 
 214. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 377. 
 215. See Amar, supra note 132, at 767, 774; VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. X 
(defining “general warrants” as warrants “whereby any officer or messenger 
may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact 
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is 
not particularly described and supported by evidence”). For an example of a 
writ of assistance and the contemporary judicial decisions defending them, see 
5 PHILIP KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 223–24 
(2000). 
 216. LASSON, supra note 207, at 51–78; TEDFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24–46 (1969); see Amsterdam, supra note 
210, at 367, 388–89, 398; Clancy, supra note 207, at 1002–04; Crocker, supra 
note 204, at 350‒53; see also United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 
1930) (“[T]he real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, 
that invasion of a man’s privacy which consists in rummaging about among 
his effects to secure evidence against him”).  
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General when solicited to defend writs of assistance, described 
general warrants in a 1761 court argument as “the worst in-
strument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English 
liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was 
found in an English law book.”217 Among those in the audience 
for Otis’s speech was a young attorney named John Adams, 
who would later be a principal contributor to the text of the 
Fourth Amendment.218
 
 217. James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, in AMERICAN SPEECHES; THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (Ted Widner ed. 1st ed. 2006). Otis’ objections 
to writs of assistance as a form of general warrant focused on breadth and 
scope, their inability to limit the discretion of officers who would become petty 
tyrants, and the authority to delegate search responsibilities to others, who in 
turn might act as tyrants.  
 It is therefore no surprise that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures” and insists upon warrants issued only “upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
  In the first place, the writ is UNIVERSAL, being directed “to all 
and singular justices, sheriffs, constables and all other officers and 
subjects &c.” so that, in short, it is directed to every subject in the 
King’s dominions; every one with this writ may be a tyrant; if this 
commission be legal, a tyrant may in a legal manner, also, control, 
imprison or murder any one within the realm.  
  In the next place, IT IS PERPETUAL; there’s no return, a man is 
accountable to no person for his doings, every man may reign secure 
in his petty tyranny, and spread terror and desolation around him, 
until the trump of the arch angel shall excite different emotions in his 
soul.  
  In the third place, a person with this writ, in the daytime, may 
enter all houses, shops, &c., AT WILL, and command all to assist 
him.  
  Fourth, by this not only deputies, etc., but even their THEIR 
MENIAL SERVANTS, ARE ALLOWED TO LORD IT OVER US—
What is this but to have the curse of Canaan with a witness on us, to 
be the servants of servants, the most despicable of God's creation? 
Id. at 3. As an example of how the authority provided by general warrants can 
be abused, Otis then goes on to recount an episode where a certain Mr. Ware 
retained delegated authority under a general warrant held by a Mr. Pew. 
When Ware was hailed into court to answer an unrelated charge for breach of 
the Sabbath, he used the warrant as a license to seek revenge against the con-
stable who arrested him and the judge who presided over his case by subject-
ing both of their homes to lengthy and invasive searches “from the garret to 
the cellar.” Id. at 3–4. Otis’s views were well-founded in the English common 
law of the time. See Davies, supra note 42, at 562–63. 
 218. Clancy, supra note 207, at 979 (“Most of the language and structure of 
the Fourth Amendment was primarily the work of one man, John Adams.”). 
Responsibility for drafting the text of the Fourth Amendment for the First 
Congress fell to James Madison. Davies, supra note 42, at 693–94. There is no 
contest, however, that the final text, in both content and structure, was deeply 
affected by Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which was 
drafted by Adams. Clancy, supra note 207, at 980–81. 
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scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”219
Although the negative rights afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment have specific historical antecedents, the text itself 
evinces a broader historical purpose to protect against indis-
criminate and invasive governmental practices that are charac-
teristic of a surveillance state.
  
220 The protections belong to indi-
viduals and to society as a whole.221 As Anthony Amsterdam 
reports, early English judges saw indiscriminate searches as 
offenses not just against individuals, but against the “whole 
English nation.”222 For example, instructing the jury in Wilkes 
v. Wood—one of the cases widely credited as a guidepost for 
those who wrote and ratified the Fourth Amendment—Chief 
Justice Pratt warned that, if the power to engage in broad 
searches and seizures “is truly invested in the secretary of 
state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect 
the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is 
totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”223
 
 219. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Amsterdam, supra note 
 The Fourth 
210, at 388–89; 
Clancy, supra note 207, at 152–53; Davies, supra note 42, at 585, 609, 643‒44; 
see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 22 (“One of the colonists’ most potent griev-
ances against the British government was its use of general searches. The hos-
tility to general searches found powerful expression in the [Fourth Amend-
ment to the] U.S. Constitution.”). 
 220. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“But the forefa-
thers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to 
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they 
seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some 
criminals from punishment.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 
(1948) (“The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave 
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”); Amsterdam, supra note 
210, at 366 (“Looking back to . . . the specific incidents of Anglo-American his-
tory that immediately preceded the adoption of the amendment, we shall find 
that the primary abuse thought to characterize the general warrants and the 
writs of assistance was their indiscriminate quality, the license that they gave 
to search Everyman without particularized cause.”). 
 221. See supra note 220. 
 222. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 366 n.192. 
 223. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 288 (1768) 
(“A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or 
particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and void for it's uncer-
tainty; for it is the duty of the magistrate, and ought not to be left to the of-
ficer, to judge of the ground of suspicion.”); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive 
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L. J. 393, 399 (1995) (quoting Wilkes 
v. Wood, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153, 1157 (C.P. 1763)); see also Grumon v. 
Raymond, 1 CONN. 40 (1814) (“[T]he law knows of no such process as one to 
arrest all suspected persons, and bring them before a court for trial. It is an 
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Amendment reflects this societal focus by securing to “the peo-
ple” the right against unreasonable search and seizure.224 The 
Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence enforces these broad 
protections by punishing law enforcement in individual cases in 
order to effect general deterrence against future violations.225 
Thus, as Renée Hutchins has pointed out, “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment . . . erects a wall between a free society and over-
zealous police action—a line of defense implemented by the 
framers to protect individuals from the tyranny of the police 
state.”226
Bear in mind that the tyranny that inspired adoption of 
the Fourth Amendment is not necessarily the product of evil in-
tent.
  
227 Rather, tendencies toward a surveillance state are part 
of the very purpose of law enforcement.228
 
idea not to be endured for a moment. It would open a door for the gratification 
of the most malignant passions, if such process issued by a magistrate should 
skreen him from damages.”); Huckle v. Money, [1763] 95, Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.) 
769 (“To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to pro-
cure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no 
Englishman would wish to live an hour . . . .”). 
 Efforts to ensure 
 224. U.S. CONST. amend IV; see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 760 
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Today no one perhaps notices because only a 
small, obscure criminal is the victim. But every person is the victim, for the 
technology we exalt today is everyman’s master.”); Crocker, supra note 204, at 
309–10, 360; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Per-
sonal Privacy, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF 
TERRORISM 129 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig eds., 2003) (“By permitting 
searches and seizures only if reasonable, and interposing the courts between 
the privacy of citizens and the potential excesses of executive zeal, these con-
stitutional protections” help to protect against “dragnets, or general searches, 
which were anathema to the colonists who rebelled against the British 
crown.”). 
 225. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (“The rule’s 
sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment 
violations.”); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protect-
ing the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1263–72 (1982). For a critique of the 
deterrence approach to justifying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
see David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contempo-
rary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1 (2013) and David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Sil-
ver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2012). 
 226. Hutchins, supra note 135, at 444. But see Davies, supra note 42, at 
641 (“The principal historical complaint regarding constables was not their 
overzealousness so much as their inaction.”). 
 227. See KURLAND, supra note 215, at 223‒24. 
 228. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); James 
Madison, Speech at the First Congress, First Session: Amendments to the Con-
stitution (June 8, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 374–75 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1904) (worrying that, absent specific constraint, the federal govern-
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peace and security naturally impel the state toward the most 
expansive and efficient means of detecting and preventing 
crime.229 In this sense, “The Bill of Rights in general and the 
Fourth Amendment in particular are profoundly anti-
government documents [in that] [t]hey deny to government . . . 
desired means, efficient means . . . to obtain legitimate and 
laudable objectives.”230 But the constraint is necessary because 
law enforcement, qua law enforcement, will naturally seek eve-
ry advantage it can to catch criminals without necessarily con-
sidering the broader consequences for liberty and democracy.231
The specters of a tyrannical surveillance state that plagued 
our founding-era forebears no doubt warranted constitutional 
attention.
 
Reduced to a phrase familiar to every student of elementary 
school civics, this is the Fourth Amendment’s critical role in our 
constitutional system of checks and balances. 
232 They lived in a world in which executive agents 
kicked down doors, entered homes, and rummaged through 
drawers at will.233 Law-abiding citizens might have hoped that 
they were immune from such intrusions, but that would have 
been naïve.234 A state interested in maintaining its own author-
ity and ensuring maximum security is not so discriminate.235
 
ment would revert to the use of general warrants under the “necessary and 
proper clause”). 
 As 
 229. See Balkin, supra note 17, at 3–4; Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 378–
79. 
 230. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 353. 
 231. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); BAMFORD, 
SHADOW, supra note 6, at 111 (describing how NSA surveillance efforts have 
expanded rapidly during the cold war and in the wake of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, “due to limited outside oversight” because it “wanted to 
be able to target thousands of people simultaneously, some briefly and some 
long term, without the hassle of justifying them to anyone higher than an 
anonymous shift supervisor”). 
 232. See Madison, supra note 228, at 374; Otis, supra note 217, at 1‒5. 
 233. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765) pro-
vided another pre-revolutionary example of what life in such a state might 
look like. There, Chief Justice Camden famously wrote that the common law of 
England prohibited indiscriminate governmental trespass upon private prop-
erty and that such invasions could only be justified “by public law” and “for the 
good of the whole.” Id. 
 234. See Madison, supra note 228, at 374‒75. 
 235. See John F. Mercer, Essays by a Farmer, MARYLAND GAZETTE (Feb. 
15, 1788) reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbery J. Storind 
ed. 1981) (“[S]uppose for instance, that an officer of the United States should 
force the house, the asylum of a citizen, by virtue of a general warrant, I would 
ask, are general warrants illegal by the constitution of the United States? 
Would a court, or even a jury, but juries are no longer to exist, punish a man 
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our founders learned, it will cut a broad swath, targeting not 
only criminals but also eccentrics and troublemakers, including 
political activists, academics, artists, and promoters of disfa-
vored religions.236 Today we are relearning the same lesson as 
government search programs target everyone who makes phone 
calls or uses the Internet.237
As William Stuntz has pointed out, it was precisely these 
broad government attacks on speech and conscience in the con-
text of heresy and sedition cases that informed the substantive 
character of the Fourth Amendment at its inception.
  
238 As we 
discussed in Part I, the threat of surveillance is a powerful tool 
for modifying behavior as well as character.239 Thus illuminat-
ed, the Fourth Amendment is revealed as playing a critical role 
in our system of constitutional protections because it prohibits 
the kinds of broad programs of indiscriminate search that 
might render docile a people defined by their spirit of liberty.240
 
who acted by express authority, upon the bare recollection of what once was 
law and right? I fear not, especially in those cases which may strongly interest 
the passions of government, and in such only have general warrants been 
used.”). 
  
 236. Individuals in these categories have always been the natural targets 
of tyranny. The certainly were in the founding era. See Crocker, supra note 
204, at 346–50. Writs of assistance in the colonies were little more than pro-
tection of petty tyrants, who sometimes used them to retaliate against out-
spoken citizens. See LASSON, supra note 207, at 59–60. Things have not 
changed significantly since. Abusive regimes from Asia to Africa to Europe to 
South America have put political opponents, intellectuals, artists, and reli-
gious leaders under surveillance, or worse. JEAN-PAUL BRODEUR & STEPHANIE 
LEMAN-LANGLOIS, THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILANCE AND VISIBILITY 183–
90 (Richard Ericson & Kevin D. Iagerty eds., 2006). The same impulses of dis-
trust are suffused through our politics. Nixon bugged not drug lords but the 
headquarters of his political rivals and civil rights agitators. Nat Hentoff, For-
ty Years of Growing Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, http://www 
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-any-good-come-of-watergate/since 
-watergate-government-surveillance-is-more-sophisticated.  
 237. These are, of course, the groups targeted by recently revealed surveil-
lance programs directed by the FBI and NSA. See supra notes 1–6, 82–85 and 
accompanying text. 
 238. Stuntz, supra note 223, at 394. 
 239. See Cohen, supra note 90, at 1425‒26. 
 240. See Crocker, supra note 204, at 360; see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 
445, 466–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment de-
mands that we temper our efforts to apprehend criminals with a concern for 
the impact on our fundamental liberties of the methods we use. I hope it will 
be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance methods 
they would sanction were among those described 40 years ago in George Or-
well's dread vision of life in the 1980’s . . . .”); BAMFORD, SHADOW, supra note 
6, at 31 (quoting NSA head Michael Hayden’s comments on the movie Enemy 
of the State: “But I’m not too uncomfortable with a society that makes its boo-
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The concerns about broad programs of indiscriminate 
search that drove us to adopt the Fourth Amendment in 1791 
are raised anew with law enforcement’s unfettered access to 
contemporary surveillance technologies.241 The stakes are pro-
found. Should law enforcement have unrestricted access to 
technologies like GPS-enabled tracking, drones, and massive 
data aggregation systems capable of effecting broad and indis-
criminate surveillance of all of us, all of the time, across every 
dimension of our daily lives? Or, in the alternative, does the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee to all of us and to each of us the 
right not to live in this kind of surveillance state? As we see it, 
the Fourth Amendment’s text, history, and doctrine leave no 
doubt that it is the latter.242
The governing standard for determining whether law en-
forcement conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” is 
described by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in United 
States v. Katz.
  
243
 
geyman secrecy and power. That’s really what the movie’s about—it was about 
the evils of secrecy and power . . . making secrecy and power the boogeymen of 
political culture, that’s not a bad society”); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling place or other private places . . . . Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of the self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct.”). Alas, there is already evidence that the surveil-
lance state initiated in the United States over the course of the last decade has 
produced precisely this sort of docility, which we feel certain our forefathers 
would have deplored. In a recent Pew Research Center poll seeking reactions 
to recent revelations about surveillance programs operated by the FBI and 
NSA, fifty-six percent of respondents thought it was “acceptable” that the 
“NSA [is] getting secret court orders to track calls of millions of Americans to 
investigate terrorism.” PEW RESEARCH CTR., MAJORITY VIEWS NSA PHONE 
TRACKINGS AS ACCEPTABLE ANTI-TERROR TACTIC 2 (June 10, 2013). Fortu-
nately, the Fourth Amendment stands as a bulwark against docility as well. 
See Davies, supra note 42, at 657–60. The very function of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights in a constitutional democracy is to prevent the degradation 
of those rights by inattention or even by democratic means. Id. 
 Under the Katz inquiry, the Court will recog-
nize a subjectively manifested expectation of privacy as “rea-
 241. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (“I also join the opinion because it condemns electronic surveillance, for 
its similarity to the general warrants out of which our Revolution sprang and 
allows a discreet surveillance only on a showing of ‘probable cause.’”); TAPAC, 
supra note 83, at 35 (“The greatest risk of government data mining is that ac-
cess to individually identifiable data chills individual behavior . . . . This helps 
explain the constitutional hostility to general searches—to government sur-
veillance without individualized suspicion—by the government.”). 
 242. See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text. 
 243. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). 
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sonable” if it is an expectation that is broadly shared by most 
citizens, realistic in light of common social practices, and 
threatened by unfettered governmental intrusion.244 From an 
ethnographic point of view, it is hard to contest Renée 
Hutchins’s observation that “citizens of this country largely ex-
pect the freedom to move about in relative anonymity without 
the government keeping an individualized, turn-by-turn itiner-
ary of our comings and goings.”245 There is no doubt that tech-
nology capable of pervasive monitoring implicates those rea-
sonable and generally held expectations of privacy.246 Anthony 
Amsterdam perhaps put it best, writing that “[t]he insidious, 
far-reaching and indiscriminate nature of electronic surveil-
lance—and, most important, its capacity to choke off free hu-
man discourse that is the hallmark of an open society—makes 
it almost, although not quite, as destructive of liberty as ‘the 
kicked-in door.’”247
*  *  *   
 
 In Part I, we explored how information privacy scholar-
ship has provided theoretical and practical justifications for the 
proposition that we can and should maintain expectations of 
privacy in large quanta of personal information. In this Part, 
we demonstrated that the fundamental concerns for liberty and 
democracy that lie at the heart of this work illuminate Fourth 
Amendment concerns expressed by the concurring opinions in 
United States v. Jones. The next question, then, is how to trans-
late the Fourth Amendment imperative to protect reasonable 
expectations in quantitative privacy into practice.248
 
 244. See id. at 361; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 
(1986) (applying the social inquiry prong of justice Harlan’s reasonable expec-
tations of privacy test). 
 We take up 
that challenge in the next Part.  
 245. Hutchins, supra note 135, at 455; see also Jones v. United States, 132 
S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., 
concurring). One might argue that, as a descriptive matter, emerging surveil-
lance technologies make it unreasonable to expect this level of privacy. As we 
argue below, this amounts to “technological determinism run amok.” See infra 
notes 387–92 and accompanying text. 
 246. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 759–60 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (“Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They 
make it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free 
society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient; and po-
lice omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.” (quoting Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 247. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 388. 
 248. Balkin, supra note 17, at 23; Kerr, supra note 33, at 330–54.  
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III.  THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH TO 
QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY   
Fourth Amendment debates about quantitative privacy 
have so far been dominated by discussion of the “mosaic” theo-
ry.249 Under the mosaic theory, Fourth Amendment interests 
would be determined on a case-by-case basis by assessing the 
quality and quantity of information about a suspect gathered in 
the course of a specific investigation.250 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted this ap-
proach in the predecessor to Jones.251 The concurring opinions 
in Jones also appear to endorse the mosaic theory.252 In the 
months after Jones, prominent quantitative privacy advocates 
have come forward to expand, explore, and defend the mosaic 
approach.253 At the same time, the mosaic approach has been a 
target for pointed criticism on both doctrinal and practical 
grounds.254
In our view, the threshold Fourth Amendment question 
raised by quantitative privacy concerns is whether an investi-
gative technique or technology has the capacity to facilitate 
broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that raise the 
specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that 
technology is left to the unfettered discretion of government.
 We think that the Fourth Amendment and the pri-
vacy issues at stake, as we have described them here, suggest 
taking a different tack.  
255 
There are a number of ways that the Fourth Amendment sta-
tus of a surveillance technique or technology could be deter-
mined. The most obvious would be for anyone who knows that 
he or she has been subject to surveillance by a novel technolo-
gy, or dramatically improved existing technology, to file a civil 
suit seeking equitable relief or even damages.256
 
 249. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54; Kerr, supra note 
 In such an ac-
33, at 330–54; 
Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3.  
 250. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3. 
 251. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d United States v. Jones, 132 U.S. 945 (2012). 
 252. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
 253. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 53, at 3–4, 12–23. 
 254. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 330–54. 
 255. See Freiwald, supra note 41, at 15–18 (arguing for a Fourth Amend-
ment focus on surveillance technologies). 
 256. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1338 (2013) (holding that 
Article III requires that a party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or executive conduct licensed 
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) must have actual 
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tion, a court would first need to determine whether the tech-
nology at issue should be subject to Fourth Amendment regula-
tion. Among the important factors that a court would need to 
consider are: (1) the inherent scope of a technology’s surveil-
lance capabilities, be they narrow or broad; (2) the technology’s 
scale and scalability; and (3) the costs associated with deploy-
ing and using the technology. If a court finds that a challenged 
technology is capable of broad and indiscriminate surveillance 
by its nature, or is sufficiently inexpensive and scalable so as to 
present no practical barrier against its broad and indiscrimi-
nate use, then granting law enforcement unfettered access to 
that technology would violate reasonable expectations of quan-
titative privacy.257
The critical goal, of course, will be to tailor an approach 
that satisfies Fourth Amendment standards by reflecting a 
clear understanding and appreciation of both the law enforce-
ment and privacy interests at stake.
  
258
Once a surveillance technology has been identified as im-
plicating the Fourth Amendment, and a reasonable approach to 
limiting law enforcement’s access and discretion has been de-
vised, subsequent litigants would have the option of challeng-
ing law enforcement’s conformance with the regulatory scheme 
(be it a warrant regime or some other means), the constitution-
ality of law enforcement’s conduct regardless of the scheme, or 
both. For students of criminal procedure, there is no surprise 
here. After all, defendants subject to physical searches of their 
homes are at liberty to challenge the constitutionality of local 
warrant procedures,
  
259 the constitutionality of a warrant,260
 
knowledge that he, she, or it is subject to surveillance under FISA, an order of 
the FISC, or both, in order to establish standing). Although it is not necessary 
to our argument here, we see no reason why any citizen could not bring a 
Fourth Amendment claim challenging law enforcement’s unfettered access to 
a surveillance technology or the Fourth Amendment sufficiency of a legislative 
or executive regulatory scheme governing law enforcement’s access to a sur-
veillance technology. After all, each of us has an equal share in the right of the 
people to be secure from the vagaries of a surveillance state.  
 and 
 257. See supra Parts I‒II. 
 258. In other work, we have described in detail and at length some of the 
law enforcement interests served by many emerging surveillance and data ag-
gregation technologies. See generally Gray, Citron & Rinehart, supra note 25. 
 259. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 246 (1977) (challenging 
constitutionality of local procedure whereby magistrates were only paid if they 
issued a warrant); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (chal-
lenging local practice of allowing law enforcement officials to issue warrants). 
 260. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (challenging war-
rant for licensing overly invasive search); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 
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even the constitutionality of law enforcement’s conduct during 
a warranted search.261
In this Part, we elaborate further how this technology-
centered approach would work in practice by considering how it 
would apply to emerging surveillance technologies, such as aer-
ial drones, GPS-enabled tracking, the NSA’s telephonic and da-
ta surveillance programs, and the NYPD’s Domain Awareness 
System, and how it would apply to traditional investigative 
methods like human surveillance. We begin by explaining the 
Fourth Amendment pedigree of our technology-centered ap-
proach.  
 Thus, although the technology-centered 
approach to conceptualizing and defending Fourth Amendment 
rights to quantitative privacy proposed here is novel, its appli-
cation would not require straying from well-traveled litigation 
pathways. 
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENTS FOR A TECHNOLOGY-
CENTERED APPROACH 
The Fourth Amendment guards against the government’s 
unfettered use of techniques and technologies that raise the 
specter of a surveillance state.262 For our forebears, those fears 
arose in reaction to the broad and indiscriminate use of physi-
cally invasive searches and seizures.263
 
465 (1976) (challenging warrant for licensing overbroad search). 
 Today, the risk of a sur-
veillance state arises with law enforcement’s unfettered access 
to advanced surveillance technologies, including aerial drones, 
GPS-enabled tracking devices, and data aggregation and min-
 261. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (challenging 
law enforcement’s failure to “knock and announce” when conducting a war-
ranted search); Hummel-Jones v. Strope, 25 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(challenging length of time individuals on the scene of a warranted search 
were detained). 
 262. See generally Crocker, supra note 204. 
 263. Stuntz, supra note 223, at 402–03 (1995). See also Davies, supra note 
42, at 578–82, 736 (“The common-law tradition viewed any form of discretion-
ary authority with unease—but delegation of discretionary authority to ordi-
nary, ‘petty,’ or ‘subordinate’ officers was anathema to framing-era lawyers;” 
and “[the Framers] banned general warrants in order to prevent the officer 
from exercising discretionary authority.”); James Madison, Amendments to the 
Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197, 205 
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1979) (“It is true the powers of the general gov-
ernment are circumscribed; they are directed to particular objects; but even if 
government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with 
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the 
same manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions 
may to an indefinite extent.”). 
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ing projects like DAS, fusion centers, and NSA’s telephonic and 
data surveillance programs.264 In her concurring opinion in 
Jones, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the democratic conse-
quences of these technologies, which can capture “at a relative-
ly low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information 
about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered dis-
cretion, chooses to track.”265 The Information Privacy Project’s 
concerns animate Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones. In-
formed by the project’s work, we see strong Fourth Amendment 
grounds for regulating government’s access to and use of inves-
tigative technologies that are capable of broad and indiscrimi-
nate data collection, data retention, data analysis, and direct 
monitoring because they are “inimical to democratic society.”266
Although it has not squarely addressed the issue, existing 
Supreme Court doctrine exhibits considerable sympathy for the 
proposition that emerging technologies capable of amassing 
large quantities of information about individuals implicate 
Fourth Amendment bulwarks against a surveillance state.
  
267
 
 264. Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (“What the ancients knew as ‘eavesdropping,’ we now call ‘electronic 
surveillance’; but to equate the two is to treat man’s first gunpowder on the 
same level as the nuclear bomb. Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler 
of human privacy ever known. . . . [T]he concepts of privacy which the Found-
ers enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly 
allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and 
other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to 
shield them from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them 
the health and strength to carry on.”). 
 In 
 265. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 312–13 (1972) 
(“[A] recognition of these elementary truths does not make employment by 
Government of electronic surveillance a welcome development—even when 
employed with restraint and under judicial supervision. There is, understand-
ably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be 
used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the 
Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy . . . . [Katz] implicitly recognized that 
the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational priva-
cy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth 
Amendment safeguards.” (citations omitted)); White, 401 U.S. at 760 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (“I would stand by Berger and Katz and reaffirm the need for 
judicial supervision under the Fourth Amendment of the use of electronic sur-
veillance which, uncontrolled, promises to lead us into a police state.” (citation 
omitted)); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (“[T]he fantastic advanc-
es in the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the 
privacy of the individual . . . indiscriminate use of such devices in law en-
forcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.” (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) 
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the years since the Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791, 
courts routinely have been called upon to evaluate the potential 
of emerging investigative techniques and technologies to dimin-
ish privacy.268 When unfettered access to those methods raises 
the specter of a surveillance state, courts have limited their use 
by applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness stand-
ards.269 For example, in United States v. Knotts,270 the Court in-
dicated that “dragnet type law enforcement practices” might 
threaten broadly held privacy expectations.271 The technological 
capacity to effect pervasive surveillance was also at issue in 
United States v. Kyllo, which concerned the use of a heat detec-
tion device to monitor invisible thermal emanations from a 
home.272 Writing for the Court in Kyllo, Justice Scalia empha-
sized that the Court must not “permit police technology to 
erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment,”273 in-
cluding existing technologies and “more sophisticated systems 
that are already in use or in development.”274
Our technology-centered approach to protecting quantita-
tive privacy follows this familiar doctrinal path, invoking the 
Fourth Amendment to guard against indiscriminate intrusions 
that compromise individuals’ “power to control what others can 
come to know” about them.
  
275
B. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND AERIAL 
SURVEILLANCE DRONES 
 In the sections that follow, we ex-
plain how that general approach would apply to investigative 
technologies and methods like drones, DAS, the NSA’s data 
surveillance programs, and human surveillance.  
If an image could serve as the paradigm of the surveillance 
state, it would be the all-seeing government eye in the sky.276
 
(Warren, J., concurring))).  
 
 268. BREYER, supra note 95, at 67. 
 269. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 270. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 271. Id. at 284. For further discussion of Knotts, see infra notes 410–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 272. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29. 
 273. Id. at 34. 
 274. Id. at 36. 
 275. BREYER, supra note 95, at 66. 
 276. For example, the seal for the Office of Information Awareness, which 
developed and operated the notorious Total Information Awareness system 
through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, features an image of 
an eye atop a pyramid, similar to that which is found on the back of the one-
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Drones implicate Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative 
privacy because they can facilitate exactly this kind of broad 
and indiscriminate surveillance when their deployment and use 
is left to the unfettered discretion of government agents. We 
turn first to considerations of scope. Although an individual 
drone can only monitor what it can see, it can see quite a lot.277 
Furthermore, unlike manned aircraft, drones can stay aloft for 
long periods of time, providing constant streams of information 
for nearly indefinite periods of time.278 The technology is also 
highly scalable and increasingly inexpensive, promising an ev-
er-expanding fleet of drones creating an ever-broadening sur-
veillance net in the skies above us.279
In addition to being broad, surveillance accomplished using 
drones is indiscriminate in that everyone within the field of the 
drones’ vision is under constant surveillance regardless of 
whether there is reason to suspect any particular person of 
wrongdoing. Drones are also covert by design.
 Thus, there appears to be 
no real limit on the breadth of surveillance that drones can ac-
complish. 
280 Thus, even if 
some places end up being unmonitored some of the time, the 
ambient threat of unlimited surveillance by drones would re-
main ubiquitous and constant. It is hard to think of a better de-
scription of life in a surveillance state than to know that no 
matter where you go, and no matter when, there is an eye-in-
the sky that is or may be watching you.281
 
dollar bill, casting its lighted vision on the planet earth. See Hendrik 
Hertzberg, Too Much Information, NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2002, http://www 
.newyorker.com/archive/2002/12/09/021209ta_talk_hertzberg.  
 For these reasons, we 
 277. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 32 (reporting that the Reaper drone 
outfitted with a Gorgon Stare device can “surveil an area 2 ½ miles across 
from 12 angles at once”). 
 278. Id. at 33 (reporting on one drone, the manufacturer of which “promises 
‘more than 21 days of unblinking stare’” and another in development that will 
stay aloft for five years); see also News Release, Northrop Grumman, Northrop 
Grumman Awarded $517 Million Agreement for U.S. Army Airship with Un-
blinking Eye, (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/ 
pages/news_releases.html?d=194252. 
 279. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 28 (reporting that drones retail for as 
little as $300); see also Darrell Preston, Drones Take to American Skies on Po-
lice, Search Missions, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-05-31/drones-take-to-american-skies-on-police-search-missions 
.html (comparing cost of some drones to squad cars). 
 280. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 33 (reporting development of a “tiny 
drone that mimics the flight of a hummingbird”). 
 281. See ORWELL, supra note 88, at 4 (“There was of course no way of 
knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or 
on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was 
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think that unfettered governmental access to drones subject on-
ly to the discretion of government agents implicates reasonable 
interests in quantitative privacy; the deployment and use of 
drones should therefore be subject to Fourth Amendment regu-
lation.282
A determination that drones implicate Fourth Amendment 
interests in quantitative privacy would not bar law enforce-
ment from using the technology. Rather, what would be prohib-
ited is its “unreasonable” use. For Fourth Amendment purpos-
es, “reasonableness” requires balancing the legitimate interests 
of law enforcement against the privacy interests of citizens.
 
283
When considering the options, it is important to distin-
guish between surveillance in the context of a specific investi-
gation and ambient, general surveillance with no particular 
target in mind. Like physical searches, wiretapping, and GPS-
enabled tracking, drones are well-suited to the surveillance of 
particular suspects or crimes. For example, drones might help 
officers track a suspect or study a crime scene.
 
Just as in more familiar Fourth Amendment contexts, applying 
this balancing test as part of a technology-centered approach to 
quantitative privacy requires finding a regulatory structure 
that can preserve the investigative utility of drones while min-
imizing their risk for abuse. What does that mean in practice? 
284
 
guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. 
But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You 
had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that 
every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every move-
ment scrutinized.”); see also Grossman, supra note 
 By contrast, 
the threat to quantitative privacy posed by drones derives pri-
marily from the prospect of their broad and indiscriminate use 
7, at 31 (describing the ex-
perience of being watched by a drone as “eerie, oppressive, and somewhat an-
noying”); INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC: STANFORD 
LAW SCH. & GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC: NYU SCH. OF LAW, LIVING UNDER 
DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRAC-
TICES IN PAKISTAN 80‒87 (2012), available at http://livingunderdrones.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-nyu-living-under-drones.pdf (describing the 
mental and emotional impact of constant drone surveillance on residents of 
Pakistan). 
 282. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 32 (“The framers didn’t anticipate 
technology that could hover for days, keeping an eye on exposed backyards 
and porches, that could work in networked swarms, see through walls with 
thermal imaging, recognize faces and gaits and track license plates.”). 
 283. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997); see also Freiwald, 
supra note 41, at ¶ 67. 
 284. Christina Hernandez Sherwood, Are You Ready for Civilian Drones?, 
GOV’T TECH. MAG., Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/are 
-you-ready-for-civilian-drones.html. 
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in the context of general surveillance programs. Given this dy-
namic, the best place to strike a reasonable balance between 
the privacy and law enforcement interests at stake in the use of 
drones is likely to be at the time of deployment. Experience 
with wiretapping technology provides a helpful and illuminat-
ing analogue.  
Wiretapping technology has proven to be useful to law en-
forcement as a surveillance tool in specific investigations.285 On 
the other hand, wiretapping is also capable of facilitating broad 
programs of indiscriminate surveillance. The Verizon order dis-
cussed above suggests that the NSA is collecting and analyzing 
our telephony metadata.286 Imagine that government was also 
listening to the content of our telephone conversations, remi-
niscent of the Bush-era “Terrorist Surveillance Program.”287
To preserve reasonable expectations of privacy threatened 
by unfettered access to wiretapping technology, while still pre-
serving legitimate law enforcement interests, Congress, acting 
in the shadow of United States v. Katz,
 
There is no doubt that such a program would violate reasonable 
expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment 
precisely because it entails the broad and indiscriminate use of 
a surveillance technology. 
288
 
 285. Declan McCullagh, FBI to Announce New Net-Wiretapping Push, 
CNET (Feb. 16, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20032518-281.html. 
 passed the Title III 
 286. See Greenwald, Phone Records, supra note 1. 
 287. BAMFORD, SHADOW, supra note 6, at 177–96 (describing NSA’s war-
rantless program of collecting vast streams of international and domestic e-
mail and phone traffic passing through U.S. telecommunications pathways); 
David E. Sanger & John O’Neil, White House Begins Effort to Defend Surveil-
lance Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/ 
23/politics/23cnd-wiretap.html?_r=1&. Congress immunized from liability the 
telecommunication providers involved in the TSP program. See Congress 
Grants Telecommunications Companies Retroactive Immunity from Civil Suits 
for Complying with NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program—FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1271, 
1271–72 (2009). There is indeed no assurance that the data collected through 
that program has been discarded. In April 2012, national security author 
James Bamford reported that the NSA is spending two billion dollars to con-
struct a data center in Utah to store the information it has been collecting for 
the past decade. Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6. According to 
Bamford, “[f]lowing through its servers and routers and stored in near-
bottomless databases will be all forms of communication, including the com-
plete contents of private emails, cell phone calls, and Google searches, as well 
as all sorts of personal data trails—parking receipts, travel itineraries, 
bookstore purchases, and other digital ‘pocket litter.’” Id. 
 288. 389 U.S 347, 353 (1967) (announcing that “the underpinnings of 
Olmstead,” which held that wiretapping does not implicate the Fourth 
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Wiretap Act and then the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA).289 Under this legislative regime, law enforcement 
can only use wiretapping technology if they have prior approval 
of a court.290 Applications for wiretap warrants must describe 
the crime under investigation, identify the “communications 
sought to be intercepted,” and provide details on where and 
how those communications will be intercepted.291 A court will 
issue a wiretap order only where it determines that there is 
“probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit a particular [enumerated] of-
fense;” “probable cause for belief that particular communica-
tions concerning that offense will be obtained through such in-
terception;” and that “normal investigative procedures have 
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely 
to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”292 Wiretap orders 
must be narrowly tailored and time limited.293 Courts also have 
the authority to require regular reports during the pendency of 
a wiretap warrant and to modify the terms as investigations 
unfold.294
This congressionally devised approach to wiretaps offers a 
promising model for regulating law enforcement access to other 
direct surveillance technologies, including drones and GPS-
  
 
Amendment because it is “surveillance without any trespass . . . have been so 
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciat-
ed can no longer be regarded as controlling,” but declining to directly overrule 
Olmstead because the facts before the Court did not require doing so); see also 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (“After Katz, Congress did 
not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law gov-
erning [wiretapping]. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive 
statute, and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed 
primarily by statute and not by case law.” (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted)). 
 289. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197, 197–239; see also GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING 
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING (Oct. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/98-326.pdf.  
 290. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), (2) (2012). 
 291. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iii). 
 292. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1)(a)–(s), 2518(3).  
 293. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), (5).  
 294. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6). Many of these minimization standards were 
hailed by the Court in Katz as the sorts of efforts that, if subject to prior ap-
proval of a detached and neutral magistrate, would strike a reasonable bal-
ance between law enforcement’s interests in conducting electronic eavesdrop-
ping and the privacy interests threatened by this kind of surveillance. Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354–55 (1967). 
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enabled tracking devices. Three features of this scheme seem 
particularly useful to consider. The first is its legislative prove-
nance. Although courts are constitutionally obligated to ensure 
that Fourth Amendment standards are met, and any legislative 
scheme would ultimately be subject to court review, there is no 
bar on the political branches’ taking the first step.295 Justice 
Alito, writing for four justices in Jones, solicited just this kind 
of legislative action to regulate the use of GPS-enabled tracking 
technology.296 We share his inclination, particularly in the con-
text of emerging surveillance technologies, because the law en-
forcement and privacy interests at stake can be explored in a 
more expansive and timely manner in the context of legislative 
or executive rule making processes than they can be in the con-
text of constitutional litigation.297
Second, the Wiretap Act only allows officers to use wire-
taps during the course of specific investigations and only where 
there is probable cause to believe that the wiretap will produce 
evidence.
 
298
 
 295. Cf. Orin Kerr, Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb 
and Swire, 102 MICH. L. REV. 936, 943 (2004) (arguing that Congress can and 
should legislate on privacy rights with respect to developing technologies, ra-
ther than leaving interpretation to the courts). 
 Thus, officers are provided reasonable access to the 
technology when and where it can advance demonstrable law 
enforcement interests while also securing our general expecta-
tions that government is not listening to all of our telephone 
conversations. This seems like a fair compromise in the context 
of other direct surveillance technologies like drones and GPS-
enabled tracking. For example, drone surveillance might be 
tremendously valuable in a case like Jones because it would al-
low officers to document a suspect’s pattern of travel between 
 296. United State v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, 
the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is 
well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to 
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.” (citation omitted)). 
 297. Id.; cf. Announcement, Fed. Aviation Admin., Unmanned Aircraft Sys-
tems Test Site Selection (Feb. 14, 2013), available at https://faaco.faa.gov/ 
index.cfm/announcement/view/13143 (seeking public and expert opinions on 
rules governing drones in domestic airspace). Two bills working their way 
through Congress, S. 607 (2013) and H.R. 1852 (2013), would amend the Elec-
tronic Communication Privacy Act to require that law enforcement secure a 
warrant based on probable cause before accessing any stored electronic com-
munications no matter their age. Current law only requires a warrant for 
stored communications that are less than 180 days old. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 298. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b)–(c). 
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locations associated with a drug conspiracy.299 Drones might 
serve an important purpose when used to monitor international 
borders.300 In either case, requiring officers to obtain prior au-
thorization from a court would serve legitimate law enforce-
ment interests while also limiting access to circumstances of 
specific and demonstrated need.301 That constraint would in 
turn preserve reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy 
by allowing the vast majority of us to remain secure against the 
prospect that law enforcement “in its unfettered discretion” was 
using drones or GPS-enabled tracking devices to gather “at a 
relatively low cost . . . a substantial quantum of intimate in-
formation”302
Third, the Wiretap Act requires that courts tailor warrants 
and exercise appropriate supervisory authority.
 about all of us all of the time. 
303 Applied to 
drones, GPS-enabled tracking, and similar technologies, this 
requirement might mean setting limits on when, how, and how 
long a device can be deployed. A court might also require offic-
ers to take steps to minimize information about innocent third 
parties that is gathered incidentally.304 As in all Fourth 
Amendment cases, the guiding principle would be to strike a 
reasonable balance between the investigative needs of law en-
forcement and the privacy interests of the suspect and society 
at large.305
 
 299. See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
 
 300. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 31. 
 301. As with physical searches, imposing a warrant-type constraint on the 
deployment and use of aerial drones would not bar the use of these technolo-
gies without prior court approval in emergency situations. See Kentucky v. 
King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 
(2006). 
 302. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 303. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6).  
 304. For example, wiretap orders frequently require that officers monitor-
ing the tap make an initial assessment of relevance to their investigation and 
stop or erase any recordings that are not relevant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (re-
quiring minimization of interception of irrelevant information); cf. United 
States v. Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 462 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that inter-
preters that ceased translating recorded conversations after those parts al-
ready translated were found to be irrelevant comported with the level of min-
imization required by the wiretapping order). 
 305. It is no coincidence that this was precisely the approach taken during 
the investigation of Jones. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The investigating offic-
ers sought and received a warrant to install and monitor a GPS device on 
Jones’s car. Id. In keeping with habits developed in the wiretapping context, 
the court set limits on where and when the device could be installed and how 
long it could be monitored. See id. 
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In recommending some form of prior authority granted by 
a court as the primary tool for regulating law enforcement ac-
cess to direct surveillance technology, we are far from radical. 
This is, after all, the primary strategy for limiting physical 
searches (particularly in the home), wiretaps, and searches of 
stored electronic communications.306 Based on this experience, 
it seems that requiring officers to seek prior approval of a court 
before using direct surveillance technologies like aerial drones 
is far from unreasonable. In fact, the officers in Jones sought 
and received a warrant before installing the GPS-enabled 
tracking device on Jones’s car.307 They unfortunately failed to 
obey the terms of that warrant, but no evidence in the record 
suggested that it was onerous or unreasonable from a Fourth 
Amendment point of view to expect them to get a warrant in 
the first place.308 Quite to the contrary, that is precisely what 
the Supreme Court ultimately required.309 At the same time, 
however, it is clear that the natural impulse of government and 
law enforcement to expand surveillance capacities is now dom-
inating the debate about drones.310
C. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND DATA 
AGGREGATION 
 Absent constitutional con-
straint, there may be little to protect us against skies filled 
with ever-watchful government eyes. 
Data aggregating and mining technologies like DAS, the 
NSA’s telephonic and electronic surveillance programs, fusion 
centers, and Virtual Alabama implicate reasonable expecta-
tions of quantitative privacy principally because of their scope. 
Such technologies are, after all, designed to collect and analyze 
large quantities of data from disparate sources to construct “an 
intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to 
have.”311
 
 306. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (discussing how 
court-imposed limitations on warrants for physical searches ensure the consti-
tutionality of those searches).  
 For DAS in particular, there can be no doubt about its 
capacity to facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveil-
 307. 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 308. See generally id. 
 309. Id. at 954. 
 310. For example, sections 331 to 334, and 903 of the FAA Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 658, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012), dramatically 
expands access to, use of, and research into aerial drones in domestic airspace. 
 311. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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lance. As Mayor Bloomberg told reporters when unveiling the 
program: 
Investigators will have immediate access to information through live 
video feeds, and instantly see suspect arrest records, 911 calls associ-
ated with the suspect, related crimes occurring in the area and 
more . . . . Investigators can track where a car associated with a sus-
pect is located, and where it has been in past days, weeks or 
months . . . .312
Although the Court has yet to consider the Fourth 
Amendment implications of data aggregation and data mining 
technologies, it has highlighted the privacy concerns at stake in 
other constitutional and statutory contexts. For example, in 
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press
 
313 the Supreme Court assessed the reach 
of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 7(c), which 
prohibits federal disclosure of “records or information compiled 
for law enforcement purposes” that could “reasonably be ex-
pected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal priva-
cy.”314 The Court held that the exemption prohibited disclosure 
of FBI “rap sheets” to the media even though these records are 
compiled entirely from information already available in public 
records.315 In reaching that result, the Court focused on the ex-
panding capacity of database technology to aggregate and store 
mass quantities of personal data.316 The Court saw “a vast dif-
ference between the public records that might be found after a 
diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local 
police stations throughout the country and a computerized 
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”317 
The privacy interest in criminal rap sheets was deemed “sub-
stantial” under FOIA because “in today’s society the computer 
can accumulate and store information” to such an extent and 
degree that it violates a “privacy interest in maintaining the 
practical obscurity” of that information.318
 
 312. Matt Williams, New York City Shows New Law Enforcement Technol-
ogy, GOV’T TECH., Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/New 
-York-City-Shows-New-Law-Enforcement-Technology.html. 
 This, of course, was 
 313. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
 314. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C). 
 315. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 767 (1989) (2012). 
 316. Id. at 770.  
 317. Id. at 764. 
 318. Id. at 780; see also Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The 
Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1597745 (importing the 
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in 1989.319 The technologies for both data gathering320 and data 
storage321 have increased in power on an exponential scale over 
the intervening years, measured now not in bytes or mega-
bytes, but in zettabytes and yottabytes,322 while costs have fall-
en past negligible.323
The political branches have also wrestled with the privacy 
consequences of data aggregation technologies. In 1973, the 
  
 
notion of practical obscurity from Reporters to the private collection of online 
personal data).  
 319. See generally 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
 320. Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE CAUCUS BLOG (Aug. 14, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/advances-in-data-storage-have-implications-for 
-government-surveillance/ (reporting that “the technology to capture and store 
such data is no longer a limiting factor [for the Data Awareness Program]”). 
By their nature, data aggregation systems take advantage of existing surveil-
lance pathways, and therefore require very little additional costs. For exam-
ple, the recently revealed program operated by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation and the National Security Agency gathering metadata for all telephonic 
communications in the United States costs the government nothing because 
the data is gathered by telephone companies and passed to the National Secu-
rity Agency under order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See In 
re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Productino of Tangible 
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI Commc’n 
Servs., Inc., No. BR13-80, at 1 (FISA Ct., Apr. 25, 2013) (unpublished), availa-
ble at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/Verizon 
-telephone-data-court-order. So too, the much broader data collection efforts 
reported by James Bamford and described by whistleblower Edward Snowden 
providing government access to the contents of virtually every electronic com-
munication that travels through the United States. See Glenn Greenwald, 
Ewen MacAskill, & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Be-
hind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN, June 9, 2013, http://www 
.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower 
-surveillance; see also Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6.  
 321. See Shane, supra note 320 (reporting that “[t]he estimated cost of stor-
ing on gigabyte of digital data, adjusted for inflation to 2011 dollars, fell from 
$85,000 in 1984 to 5 cents in 2011”). In 2011, a report from the Brookings In-
stitute estimated that it would cost the government 17 cents on a per capita 
basis to store all telephone conversations conducted in the United States, fall-
ing to 2 cents by 2015. JOHN VILLASENOR, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY INNOVA-
TION AT BROOKINGS, RECORDING EVERYTHING: DIGITAL STORAGE AS AN ENA-
BLER OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS 4 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/14%20digital% 
20storage%20villasenor/1214_digital_storage_villasenor.pdf. Although the es-
timated cost for constructing NSA’s Cybersecurity Data Center at Camp Mar-
shall in Utah is estimated at $2 billion, its storage capacity will be measured 
in zettabytes (1021 bytes) or yottabytes (1024 bytes), making it a bargain even 
by those projected 2015 cost standards. See Bamford, The NSA is Building, 
supra note 6. 
 322. See Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6. 
 323. See supra notes 320–21 and accompanying text. 
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Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
issued a report specifying the privacy concerns raised by com-
puterized collections of personal data and offering a code of 
“fair information practices” that would provide procedural safe-
guards against the technology’s inherent potential for abuse.324 
Embodying those fair information practices, the Privacy Act of 
1974 (Privacy Act) prohibited federal agencies from maintain-
ing secret systems of personal records325 and from amassing 
personal information without a proper purpose.326 Many infor-
mation privacy laws also require opt-in consent before infor-
mation can be gathered and shared. For example, the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) 
essentially bans commercial websites directed at children un-
der thirteen from collecting information directly from youths 
without a parent or guardian’s verifiable knowledge and con-
sent.327 More recently, proposals for “Do Not Track” legislation 
would limit Internet companies from collecting consumers’ web-
browsing data to instances where the consumer agreed to such 
collection under an opt-in regime.328
 
 324. REGAN, supra note 
  
39, at 76. 
 325. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (regulating federal government agencies’ 
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information). 
 326. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (agencies shall “maintain in its records only 
such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accom-
plish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or by ex-
ecutive order of the President”). The Privacy Act was passed out of concern 
over “the impact of computer data banks on individual privacy.” H.R. Rep. No. 
93-1416, at 7 (1974). 
 327. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2000). As Anita Allen explains, under COPPA, 
parents are “ascribed a powerful right to veto primary collection, primary use, 
secondary use, and even maintenance of data.” ALLEN, supra note 92, at 178. 
In response to COPPA, social network sites like Facebook only permit users 
who are 13 and up; obtaining verifiable parental consent is both costly and 
risky if entities learn that parental consent is not valid, as the Federal Trade 
Commission has enforcement power over COPPA violations. Id. at 179–80 
(discussing the FTC’s enforcement actions for COPPA violations). Nonetheless, 
as social media scholar Danah Boyd and her colleagues have shown, parents 
routinely assist young children in lying to social network sites like Facebook 
so that their children can use those services, in some sense turning the pur-
pose of the statute on its head. Danah Boyd et al., Why Parents Help Their 
Children Lie to Facebook About Their Age: Unintended Consequences of the 
‘Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act’, FIRST MONDAY, Nov. 7, 2011, http:// 
www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3850/3075. 
 328. In 2011, several “Do Not Track” bills were proposed that would protect 
consumer information from being used without consent. Mark Hachman, Do 
Not Track Legislation on the Move, PC MAG., May 6, 2011, http://www.pcmag 
.com/article2/0,2817,2385045,00.asp. 
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These past efforts by the Court and the political branches 
to develop constraints on the deployment and use of data ag-
gregation technologies provide useful models for accommodat-
ing Fourth Amendment interests implicated by technologies 
like DAS. When considering the options, it is critical to high-
light the fact that some data aggregation technologies cannot 
adequately serve legitimate government interests if they can be 
deployed only in the context of discrete investigations and with 
the prior approval of a court. That is because systems like DAS 
are designed for early detection and to create an archived rec-
ord of information that can be mined retrospectively.329 To serve 
those purposes, these technologies need to be running all the 
time. If law enforcement agencies were required to develop 
probable cause before deploying a system like DAS, then these 
critical interests would not be served. On the other hand, these 
systems, by their very nature, engage in precisely the sort of 
broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is characteristic of a 
surveillance state, and therefore threaten reasonable expecta-
tions of quantitative privacy.330
Where data aggregation and mining technologies like DAS 
are concerned, we suspect that the best way to accommodate 
both law enforcement interests and interests in quantitative 
privacy is through negotiated agreements akin to consent de-
crees. Consent decrees are a common tool used by parties to 
cases challenging the constitutionality of law enforcement prac-
tices. For example, in Handschu v. Special Services Division,
 Where, then, are we to strike a 
reasonable balance between these competing interests? 
331
 
 329. See Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Mil-
lion Super Computer System that Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License 
Plate Readers and Crime Reports, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www 
.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computer 
-system-data-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-crime-reports-article 
-1.1132135 (reporting how DAS may be mined). 
 
the New York City Police Department entered into an agree-
ment with civil rights advocates and labor organizations that 
limited investigations of purely political activity and indiscrim-
inate photography at political gatherings. The terms of the 
agreement were enforced in the first instance by a special 
commission of the NYPD, which then answered to the United 
 330. See Bill Keller, Living with the Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMES, June 
16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/opinion/keller-living-with-the 
-surveillance-state.html (likening DAS to Orwell’s “Big Brother” of 1984). 
 331. 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York.332 
The terms of the Handschu consent decree, and its enforcement 
structure, served a purpose similar to Odysseus’s decision to 
bind himself to the mast of his ship so he could listen to the Si-
rens’ song without running the risk that he would steer himself 
and his crew onto the Sirenum scopuli.333
Once it is established that technologies like DAS implicate 
reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy, it will be in-
cumbent upon law enforcement agencies to coordinate with cit-
izens and interest groups to develop regulatory frameworks 
that strike a reasonable balance between competing inter-
ests.
 The consent decree 
allowed law enforcement to pursue legitimate criminal investi-
gations that intersected with political activities within the 
bounds of rule-ordered supervision designed to minimize the 
risk that their investigations would indiscriminately infringe 
First Amendment freedoms. A similar approach holds signifi-
cant promise for protecting Fourth Amendment rights against 
the indiscriminate use of data aggregation and mining technol-
ogies like DAS. 
334
In most cases, these agreements will feature limits on the 
scope of data collection, retention, and use
  
335—what Jon Elster 
might call “technological precommitments”336
 
 332. Id. at 1389–90. 
—implemented 
through design choices and administrative review structures. 
 333. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 276–77 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 
1997). For more on the dynamics of precommitment and rationality, see JON 
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONAL-
ITY 36–47 (1979). 
 334. Although we do not endorse all of its recommendations, or necessarily 
regard them as sufficient, the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee 
designated by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in February 2003 to 
offer recommendations on how data aggregation systems incorporated into the 
defunct Total Awareness System might be deployed and used consistent with 
rights to privacy provides an example of the sort of joint effort we have in 
mind. See generally TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SAFE-
GUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (2004). 
 335. See TAPAC, supra note 83, at 41‒42 (discussing the dangers associat-
ed with unlimited data retention and recommending government agencies and 
their agents “clearly specif[y] the purposes of data mining, carefully evaluat[e] 
the fitness and relevance of data for the intended purpose, leav[e] the data in 
place whenever possible, and implement[] systems for updating or discarding 
outdated information”). 
 336. We refer here to Jon Elster’s important work on reason, rationality, 
and constitutional constraint. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: 
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000). 
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Both these negotiated arrangements and their application in 
particular cases would, of course, be subject to court review for 
Fourth Amendment sufficiency. Here again, experience can 
help to guide us. 
In at least some cases where law enforcement has deployed 
data aggregation technologies, there have been some efforts to 
effect restraints on collection, retention, and use of data. For 
example, the FBI has for some time been using proprietary 
software called EP2P that allows agents to identify the source 
of images containing child pornography that are distributed 
through peer-to-peer networks.337 Although the technology be-
hind EP2P could be used to search all files lodged on a suspect’s 
computer—or all files on all computers linked to a peer-to-peer 
network—the software is designed such that agents can only 
access folders that are designated as “shared.”338 New York offi-
cials report that images aggregated by DAS will be destroyed 
after thirty days unless they are part of an active investiga-
tion.339 As another example, the company Palantir, which de-
velops data analysis software for security and law enforcement 
applications,340 incorporates use controls and audit logs into 
their products that limit human access while providing a record 
of who has queried a database, when, and why.341 By using me-
ta-database management systems capable of searching across 
many discrete “federated” databases, data can also be kept in 
place rather than being aggregated into massive repositories, 
thereby limiting both the scope of surveillance and the poten-
tial for abuse by inserting access and use controls both across 
and between databases and search agents.342
 
 337. See United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1107‒08 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(describing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “EP2P” software); United 
States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 271‒72 (1st Cir. 2012) (differentiating the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s EP2P software from the commercially avail-
able program “LimeWire”); United States v. Gorski, 71 M.J. 729, 731‒33 (Ar-
my Ct. Crim. App. 2012) (describing use of a “peer-to-peer” (P2P) network to 
share and distribute files). 
 We are not sug-
 338. Budziak, 697 F.3d at 1108. 
 339. See Shane, supra note 320; see also TAPAC, supra note 83, at 41‒42 
(recommending that data aggregation programs “implement[] systems for up-
dating or discarding outdated information”). 
 340. What We Do, PALANTIR, http://www.palantir.com/what-we-do/ (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2013).  
 341. What We Believe, PALANTIR, http://www.palantir.com/what-we-believe/ 
#civilLiberties (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).  
 342. See TAPAC, supra note 83, at 41 (recommending leaving the data in 
place whenever possible); PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES INC., A CORE COMMIT-
MENT: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 3 (2012) (describing feder-
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gesting that these efforts are necessary or sufficient to mark a 
reasonable balance between the interests of law enforcement 
and those of quantitative privacy, but, in our view, they signal 
important steps in that direction and provide a useful set of ex-
amples and experiences that can help ground conversations 
about the terms of deployment and use that should govern oth-
er data aggregation technologies.  
By contrast, the data aggregation programs operated by 
the FBI and NSA, which gather metadata for every telephonic 
communication in the United States343 and aim to capture and 
store the contents of all electronic communications in massive 
servers housed in places like Camp Marshall in Utah,344 seem 
dramatically overbroad and utterly disconnected from anything 
beyond the most general and diffuse of government interests.345 
They are, in short, the very model of broad and indiscriminate 
surveillance. As a consequence, the court orders issued against 
companies like Verizon constitute a contemporary form of the 
general warrants targeted by the Fourth Amendment at its in-
ception.346
First, proponents have argued that the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (FISA) sanctions these programs and 
that members of Congress have been briefed on a regular basis 
without objecting.
 Faced with public criticism, advocates for these sur-
veillance programs have offered two major lines of defense.  
347
 
ated database architecture and how it can be used to enhance privacy protec-
tions). 
 Of course, the raison d’être of constitutions 
 343. See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-80 (F.I.S.C., Apr. 25, 2013) avail-
able at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government-documents 
-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/ (ordering the 
disclosure of “all call detail records or “telephony metadata” created by [Veri-
zon] for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) 
wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”). 
 344. See Bamford, The NSA is Building, supra note 6. 
 345. Given this massive and unreasonable disconnect, we are particularly 
gratified to see a bi-partisan group of legislators organizing around an effort—
so far unsuccessful—to constrain NSA data gathering to targets who are actu-
ally suspected of wrongdoing. See Jonathan Weisman, Momentum Builds 
Against N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2013, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics/momentum-builds-against-nsa 
-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 346. See Otis, supra note 217. Not only are these FISA orders overbroad, 
parallel revelations about the extensive use of independent contractors pre-
sent us with a contemporary instance of the delegation powers that our found-
ers regarded as odious features of writs of assistance and other general war-
rants. 
 347. Press Release, U.S. House of Representative Permanent Select Comm. 
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is to set limits on what the political branches can do through 
legislation or policy.348 In the shadow of their experiences with 
writs of assistance and the Townshend Act, our late-eighteenth 
century forebears adopted the Fourth Amendment as a bar on 
legislative attempts to license general warrants or otherwise to 
sanction policies of broad and indiscriminate search using the 
political process.349 Thus, to the extent that the FISA licenses 
new forms of general warrants and programs of broad and in-
discriminate surveillance, it is unconstitutional and the review 
and approval of some members of congress is irrelevant.350
Second, defenders of these large-scale data aggregation 
programs have argued that access to the resulting databases is 
limited by internal agency rules and policies.
  
351
 
on Intelligence, Joint Statement by House Intelligence Chairman Mike Rogers 
and Ranking Member C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger (June 6, 2013), available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/press-release/joint-statement-house 
-intelligence-chairman-mike-rogers-and-ranking-member-ca-dutch (“The col-
lection described with yesterday’s disclosure of a purported court order is con-
sistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) as passed by 
Congress, executed by the Executive Branch, and approved by a Federal Court 
. . . . When these authorities are used, they are governed by court-approved 
processes and procedures. Moreover, the use of these authorities is reviewed 
and approved by federal judges every 90 days. Additionally, the Committee 
routinely reviews all FISA activities.”). Their assertions have since been 
backed up by the declassification of agency letters sent by the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legislative Affairs to members of Congress. See Letter from 
Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sivestre 
Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/ 
g/page/politics/government-documents-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone 
-metadata-records/351/; Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Diane Feinstein, Chairman, & Saxby Chambliss, Vice 
Chairman, Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Senate (Feb. 2, 2011), available 
at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government-documents 
-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/. 
 A redacted de-
 348. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY 36‒47 (1979); David Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a 
Constitutional Comparativist . . . Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1266 
(2007); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role 
of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40‒41 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 349. Davies, supra note 42, at 578‒81, 657‒60, 663‒64, 668 (“[The framers] 
thought the important issue, and the only potential threat to the right to be 
secure, was whether general warrants could be authorized by legislation.”). 
 350. It would also cut against the grain of FISA itself, which was passed to 
constrain the NSA’s demonstrated tendency to pursue ever more expansive 
surveillance. 
 351. Jeffrey Rosen, Control Your Spooks, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 2013, at 
22 (describing James Clapper’s claims that rules attached to the original data 
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scription of these minimization procedures contained in a For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) order was declassi-
fied by the NSA in advance of congressional hearings on July 
31, 2013.352
There are, broadly, three issues at stake when evaluating 
the deployment and use of data aggregation technologies: col-
lection, access, and retention. As described, the minimization 
procedures do constrain access and also set limits on retention. 
According to the order, all metadata that is collected must be 
housed in “secure networks under NSA’s control.”
 Although much is still unknown, we see both prom-
ise and disappointment in these procedures as they have so far 
been described. Let us first consider the good.  
353 Only “au-
thorized personnel who have received appropriate and ade-
quate training”354 have access, and they are limited to conduct-
ing manual or automated “chain[ed] queries” using “seed” 
terms approved in advance by a select group of senior intelli-
gence officials or the FISC.355 Users are also subject to authen-
tication and their queries audited.356 Senior intelligence and 
Department of Justice officials are required to meet and review 
compliance with these procedures and to report their findings 
to the FISC on a regular basis.357 Finally, the order provides 
that all metadata that is collected will be destroyed no later 
than five years after collection.358
Now, let us consider the bad. The most significant problem 
 Many of these constraints on 
access and retention no doubt hold promise as executives, legis-
latures, and courts strive to effect the reasonable balance be-
tween law enforcement interests and citizen privacy demanded 
by the Fourth Amendment. Many questions remain, of course, 
among them details about what constitutes “appropriate and 
adequate training,” auditing procedures, and court oversight.  
 
aggregation warrants issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in 
support of these programs set limits on access).  
 352. See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-80 (F.I.S.C., Apr. 25, 2013), avail-
able at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/government-documents 
-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/. 
 353. Id. at 4. 
 354. Id. at 5. The Order provides an exception to this rule for “technical 
personnel responsible for NSA’s underlying corporate infrastructure and the 
transmission of the BR metadata from the specified persons to NSA . . . .” Id. 
at 5 n.3.  
 355. Id. at 6‒11. 
 356. Id. at 12‒14. 
 357. Id. at 15‒18. 
 358. Id. at 14. 
  
122 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:62 
 
with the data aggregation programs described in these leaked 
documents is the indiscriminate breadth of collection. No mat-
ter how strict, access rules and limits on retention simply can-
not render “reasonable” data collection programs that are fatal-
ly broad and indiscriminate. These programs clearly cross that 
threshold. It is impossible to imagine that any but the smallest 
mote of data gathered is relevant to anti-terrorism efforts. In 
fact, senior government officials have admitted as much.359 Fur-
thermore, the vast majority of cases cited by supporters of the 
programs’ success seem to involve queries based on evidence 
gathered through traditional law enforcement means.360 In the-
se circumstances, more narrowly tailored, case specific, data 
gathering would have done just as well, and certainly would 
have reflected a more reasonable balance between law en-
forcement interests and citizen privacy.361 Also important is the 
fact that none of these procedures has been subject to the cru-
cible of adversarial challenge. That is because the NSA has 
kept the programs secret while simultaneously arguing that 
nobody has standing to bring a challenge unless they can prove 
that they have been monitored, which is impossible because the 
program is kept secret.362
 
 359. Robert Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Re-
marks at the Newseum Special Program: NSA Surveillance Leaks: Facts and 
Fiction (June 26, 2013) (transcript on file with authors) (“Each determination 
of a reasonable suspicion under this program must be documented and ap-
proved, and only a small portion of the data that is collected is ever actually 
reviewed, because the vast majority of that data is never going to be respon-
sive to one of these terrorism-related queries.”). 
 We therefore do not know, and cannot 
 360. See id. (“The metadata that is acquired and kept under this program 
can only be queried when there is reasonable suspicion, based on specific, ar-
ticulable facts, that a particular telephone number is associated with specified 
foreign terrorist organizations.”). 
 361. See Charlie Savage, Surveillance Programs Defended as Officials Cite 
Thwarted Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013, at A18 (“Representative Adam 
B. Schiff, Democrat of California, pressed General Alexander to explain why 
the F.B.I. could not simply get the relevant logs of calls linked to a suspicious 
number without keeping a database of all domestic calls. General Alexander 
said he was open to discussing doing it that way, but added, ‘[t]he concern is 
speed in crisis.’”). 
 362. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). An action filed by 
the ACLU challenging the NSA’s gathering of telephonic metadata appears to 
have cleared this hurdle, but was only able to do so because an NSA contractor 
leaked top-secret documents. See Complaint at 6, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 11, 2013), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/files/assets/nsa_phone_spying_complaint.pdf. The Electronic 
Privacy Information Center and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have since 
filed actions challenging the NSA’s massive data gathering on statutory and 
First Amendment grounds. See In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., No. 13 (petition 
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really evaluate, the adequacy of these measures to the task of 
constraining law enforcement discretion.363
*  *  *  
 It is hard to imagine 
that those who read and wrote the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment would have thought that it allowed the government not 
only to conduct searches pursuant to general warrants, but to 
do so in secret. Thus, there is simply no other way to view these 
programs than as constitutionally unreasonable; and the au-
thority granted to them by the FISC as general warrants.  
Although this Article is the first to advance a coherent, 
doctrinally grounded proposal for regulating general surveil-
lance and data aggregation technologies like DAS, there is good 
reason to think that law enforcement agencies will be receptive. 
The NYPD has committed itself to some checks on information 
retention and sharing coordinated by DAS—including the thir-
ty-day retention policy mentioned above—in its “Public Securi-
ty Privacy Guidelines.”364 The policy sets limits on how long cer-
tain data will be stored and pledges to share information only 
with private “stakeholders” who have signed memoranda of 
understanding.365 It further claims that “[d]igital watermarking 
or an equivalent technique will be used to create an immutable 
audit log of where and when data is accessed.”366 Linking these 
technological pre-commitments to supervising administrative 
bodies—such as the special commission designated in 
Handschu—that are empowered to monitor use and to impose 
civil and administrative penalties in cases of abuse would pro-
vide further assurances that programs like DAS are serving le-
gitimate law enforcement interests while still protecting rea-
sonable expectations in quantitative privacy.367
 
for cert. filed July 8, 2013), available at https://epic.org/EPIC-FISC-Mandamus 
-Petition.pdf (challenging the program on statutory grounds); Complaint at 13, 
First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. CV 13-3287 
(N.D.C.A., filed July 16, 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/file/37386# 
page/28/mode/2up (challenging the program on First Amendment grounds).  
 Courts must 
 363. Cf. Davies, supra note 42, at 556, 578‒81, 655‒57 (arguing that the 
founders’ primary concern when adopting the Fourth Amendment was to limit 
the licensing of unconstrained discretion, specifically through the use of gen-
eral warrants). 
 364. Public Security Privacy Guidelines, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_ 
security_privacy_guidelines.pdf. 
 365. Id.at 2.  
 366. Id. at 7.  
 367. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1402 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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retain final authority to review the decisions and conduct of 
any such administrative panels, of course; but active, respon-
sive, and thoughtful internal review procedures will make court 
intervention less necessary and therefore less frequent. The 
NSA, FBI, and other federal agencies involved in collecting tel-
ephonic metadata have also instituted controls. Although they 
are inadequate given the sheer breadth and scale of the data 
that is being collected, they might well render constitutional a 
more targeted program. For the present, however, we are 
heartened by the effort, which we see as an important positive 
signal in the context of ongoing efforts to understand and ac-
commodate Fourth Amendment protections of quantitative pri-
vacy.  
D. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND HUMAN 
SURVEILLANCE 
There is a heated debate after Jones over the implications 
of quantitative privacy for many traditional law enforcement 
methods. For example, Orin Kerr has wondered whether “visu-
al surveillance [should] be subject to [mosaic analysis].”368 Jus-
tice Scalia expressed similar concerns in his majority opinion in 
Jones.369 Adding weight to their fears, Christopher Slobogin, a 
mosaic theory advocate, has argued that human surveillance 
should be subject to the same Fourth Amendment regulations 
as GPS-enabled tracking.370
Our technology-centered approach would not implicate 
human surveillance and other traditional investigative tech-
niques. As Justice Alito observed in Jones, “[human] surveil-
lance for any extended period of time [is] difficult and costly 
and therefore rarely undertaken.”
  
371 Because human surveil-
lance is incapable of sustaining the sort of broad and indiscrim-
inate surveillance that is characteristic of a surveillance state, 
it would not be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation under 
our technology-centered approach.372
 
 368. Kerr, supra note 
 This result would not 
33, at 335. 
 369. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 953‒54 (2012). 
 370. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expec-
tations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical 
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 
727, 757 (1993). 
 371. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 372. This marks a significant point of departure between us and most other 
contributors to the post-Jones debate, including Christopher Slobogin. See, 
e.g., Slobogin, supra note 53, at 25 (proposing legislative limitations on human 
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change even if law enforcement assembled a detailed mosaic 
documenting the activities of an individual suspect using mul-
tiple traditional law enforcement methods.373 Why? Because 
these mosaics, by virtue of how they are assembled, simply do 
not raise the specter of a surveillance state, and therefore do 
not trigger Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative priva-
cy.374
*  *  *   
  
Although necessarily brief, the foregoing provides a general 
account of how a technology-centered approach to quantitative 
privacy would work in practice, and how it would apply to dif-
ferent kinds of surveillance technologies and methods, includ-
ing drones, GPS-enabled tracking, DAS, the NSA’s telephonic 
and electronic surveillance program, and human surveillance. 
This goes part way to answering the demands of skeptics on 
and off the Court for a workable approach to Fourth Amend-
ment cases after Jones.375
IV.  SOME CONCERNS ABOUT QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY 
IN PRACTICE   
 We continue the journey in Part IV 
by explaining how our technology-centered approach answers 
or moots many of the most persistent objections that have been 
raised by quantitative privacy skeptics.  
Proposals to extend Fourth Amendment protections to cov-
er reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy have been 
met with considerable resistance.376 This Part addresses some 
of the most salient criticisms.377
 
surveillance conducted for periods longer than twenty minutes). 
 As our discussion shows, these 
challenges mainly target the “mosaic” theory of quantitative 
privacy. Among the many advantages of our technology-
centered approach is that it avoids many of these concerns.  
 373. Thus, our technology-based approach also answers Orin Kerr’s con-
cerns about how quantitative privacy would apply to bodies of information ag-
gregated by different law enforcement groups or agencies. See Kerr, supra note 
33, at 347. 
 374. We are in debt to James Grimmelmann for pressing us to clarity on 
this point. 
 375. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953‒54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 343‒50. 
We discuss how our technology-centered approach would provide a clear road 
forward on the facts of Jones below. See infra notes 410–29 and accompanying 
text. 
 376. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953‒54; Kerr, supra note 33, at 343‒50. 
 377. For an extended analysis of objections to the mosaic theory, see Gray 
& Citron, supra note 53, at 398‒11. 
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A. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH RESOLVES 
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES  
Critics contend that recognizing a quantitative dimension 
to Fourth Amendment privacy creates thorny practical chal-
lenges.378 Among the most nettlesome is drawing lines between 
quanta of information that implicate reasonable expectations of 
privacy and those that do not.379 Justice Scalia levels this 
charge in Jones, pointing out that Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion does not explain why short-term monitoring is accepta-
ble but “a 4-week investigation is ‘surely’ too long.”380 Orin Kerr 
has echoed Justice Scalia’s concerns.381 Kerr has also expressed 
reservations about how to parse mosaics that are aggregated 
using a variety of techniques and technologies.382
Although these line-drawing challenges may have some 
traction against a mosaic theory of quantitative privacy,
  
383
 
 378. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 953-54; Kerr, supra note 
 they 
have no bite at all against our technology-centered proposal. 
Whereas a case-by-case approach to quantitative privacy re-
quires courts to evaluate the Fourth Amendment interests im-
plicated by individual mosaics, a technology-centered approach 
interrogates the potential for abuse inherent in a given surveil-
lance technology. As new surveillance technologies become 
available, courts will need to determine whether those technol-
ogies have the capacity to facilitate the sorts of broad programs 
of indiscriminate surveillance that raise constitutional concerns 
about a surveillance state. If a particular technology does not 
raise these concerns, then the Fourth Amendment simply does 
not apply. If it does, then the government will only be allowed 
to use that technology when it can meet the demands of Fourth 
33, at 343‒50. 
 379. See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 6, 17. 
 380. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. We discuss Knotts at greater depth below. See 
infra notes 410–29 and accompanying text. 
 381. Kerr, supra note 33, at 333 (“[H]ow long must the tool be used before 
the relevant mosaic is created?”). 
 382. Id. at 335‒36. 
 383. Of course, worries about line drawing are by no means unique to 
quantitative privacy. The Fourth Amendment’s center of gravity is reasona-
bleness. See Akhil Amar, Terry and the Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1998). Assessments of reasonableness are in-
herently prone to spectrums and nuances, and seldom are amenable to bright 
line rules and dramatic contrasts. Despite these difficulties, the Court has yet 
to abandon a constitutional protection simply because it is challenging to en-
force. Rather, the Court leaves it to the lower courts to mush through the 
“factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 
(2007).  
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Amendment reasonableness.384 To be sure, assessments of rea-
sonableness—by balancing the interests of law enforcement 
and citizens—present their own challenges; but they are both 
familiar and inherent to Fourth Amendment itself.385 They are 
also downstream struggles. Under our approach, the upstream 
question of whether use of a technology constitutes a search at 
all is answered as a general matter for that technology rather 
than on a case-by-case basis.386
The results of an upstream search inquiry should not 
change merely because a surveillance technology is common-
place. In holding that thermal detection technology should be 
subject to Fourth Amendment regulation in Kyllo v. United 
States, Justice Scalia contemplated the possibility that the re-
sult in that case might have been different if that technology 
was in “general public use.”
  
387 The implication is that, if a tech-
nology is in general public use, then it is unreasonable, as a de-
scriptive matter, for anyone to expect that they are not being 
observed with that technology by fellow citizens, and therefore 
also unreasonable, as a normative matter, to expect that law 
enforcement officers should be constrained by the Fourth 
Amendment.388 This is technological determinism run amok. As 
Justice Scalia argued in Kyllo, “the power of technology to 
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy” must be limited lest we 
“permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment.”389 The alternative is to require that 
citizens “retir[e] to the cellar, cloaking all the windows with 
thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining absolutely 
quiet.”390
 
 384. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
 When faced with this alternative, “we must ask what 
we will have saved if we cede significant ground to a bunker 
mode of existence, retaining only that sliver of privacy that we 
 385. See id. at 354. 
 386. For the same reason, our technology-centered approach avoids prob-
lems relating to human-collected surveillance mosaics collected via multiple 
investigative tools and methods. For reasons described above, human surveil-
lance is not a technology that implicates quantitative privacy. See supra notes 
369–74. 
 387. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 388. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., con-
curring) (“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at 
the expense of privacy . . . .”). 
 389. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 384 
(“Fortunately, neither Katz nor the fourth amendment asks what we expect of 
government. They tell us what we should demand of government.”).  
 390. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 402. 
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cannot envision a madman exploiting.”391 To paraphrase one 
learned member of the bench, we “simply cannot imagine that 
the drafters of the Fourth Amendment dictated such dark and 
cloistered lives for citizens.”392
Our technology-centered approach also helps to clarify or 
resolve other practical challenges leveled against quantitative 
privacy. For example, in Jones, Justice Alito argues that, “long-
er term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses im-
pinges on expectations of privacy.”
 
393 This suggests that wheth-
er an investigative technology constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search relates in part to the seriousness of the crime under in-
vestigation. As Justice Scalia rightly points out for the majori-
ty, “[t]here is no precedent for the proposition that whether a 
search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being 
investigated.”394
Justice Scalia is surely right that the nature of the offense 
being investigated has no relevance to the upstream question of 
whether law enforcement conduct constitutes a “search.” Citi-
zens do not possess greater expectations of privacy in less seri-
ous crimes.
 As our technology-centered approach makes 
clear, however, there is simply no argumentative clash here.  
395 The seriousness of an offense is, however, highly 
relevant to the downstream question of whether a search is 
“reasonable.”396 As we pointed out in Part III, assessing Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness is a matter of balancing citizen in-
terests with those of law enforcement. Law enforcement natu-
rally has a weightier interest in detecting and prosecuting more 
serious crimes than it does for minor offenses.397
 
 391. Hutchins, supra note 
 When weigh-
135, at 464. 
 392. Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 97 (2d Cir. 2004) (Straub, J., dissent-
ing); see also Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 402 (“This much withdrawal is 
not required in order to claim the benefit of the amendment because, if it were, 
the amendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the kind of open soci-
ety to which we are committed and in which the amendment is supposed to 
function”); Crocker, supra note 204, at 369 (“[P]lacing pressure on persons to 
return to their individual ‘private’ worlds to seek refuge from government 
searches and surveillance diminishes the public sphere’s security.”).  
 393. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 394. Id. at 954. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 
(2011) (“A key intuitive component of reasonableness is the seriousness of the 
crime investigated.”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a)‒(s) (2012) (limiting use of wire-
tapping technology to investigations of enumerated offenses). 
 397. See Bellin, supra note 396, at 9 (“The public’s interest in any search or 
seizure surely depends to some degree on the seriousness of the crime under 
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ing the reasonableness of a search, the seriousness of the of-
fense being investigated is therefore relevant.398 Likewise, 
courts can, and should, consider the seriousness of the offense 
being investigated as a factor when determining whether law 
enforcement officers acted reasonably during a search or sei-
zure.399
Critics might grant us these points, but argue that our 
technology-centered approach comes with its own baggage. For 
example, a skeptic might argue that focusing on the technology 
begets its own line-drawing problems.
 Thus, a court would be far more likely to grant a war-
rant for GPS-enabled tracking for a month if probable cause ex-
ists to believe both that the target is directing a large drug 
conspiracy and that the tracking will produce additional im-
portant evidence, as was in fact the case in Jones, but less like-
ly to grant a similar warrant for a person suspected of perpe-
trating occasional minor speeding offenses.  
400
 
investigation.”); Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public 
Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1598 (2010) (re-
porting that public opinion polls rate investigations of serious crimes as less 
intrusive than investigations of minor crimes); William J. Stuntz, Commen-
tary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amend-
ment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 870, 875 (2001) (“A large factor in government 
need—perhaps the largest—is the crime the government is investigating . . . 
the worst crimes are the most important ones to solve, the ones worth paying 
the largest price in intrusions on citizens’ liberty and privacy.”). 
 Specifically, they 
 398. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380 (1985) (Stevens, J., con-
curring and dissenting in part) (“The logic of distinguishing between minor 
and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is al-
most too clear for argument.”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) 
(“Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless 
arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underly-
ing offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor.”); 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain 
a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought 
to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach 
it.”); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984) (“But maybe in 
dealing with so intrusive a technique as television surveillance, other methods 
of control as well, such as banning the technique outright from use in the 
home in connection with minor crimes, will be required, in order to strike a 
proper balance between public safety and personal privacy.”); Christopher 
Slobogin, The World Without the Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
68‒75 (1991).  
 399. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“A police officer may 
not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”); Cipes v. 
Graham, 386 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing the fact that plaintiff 
was only suspected of a misdemeanor offense as relevant to determining 
whether a nighttime raid of his house was “reasonable”). 
 400. We are in debt to Richard Myers and others who have pressed us on 
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might argue that DAS and drones represent easy examples of 
technologies that raise quantitative privacy concerns, but that 
courts inevitably will confront technologies whose Fourth 
Amendment status is not as clear. These are not new problems 
for Fourth Amendment law, of course.401 To the contrary, they 
are endemic to the reasonableness inquiry that lies at the heart 
of contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine.402 We therefore 
accept the inevitability of close cases. In doing so, however, we 
emphasize that the systemic burden of close cases will be much 
lighter under a technology-centered approach than they would 
be under a mosaic theory. That is because, whether it is a close 
call or not, once the Fourth Amendment status of a technology 
has been established, the threshold question of whether use of 
that technology constitutes a Fourth Amendment search does 
not need to be litigated in every case where the technology is 
used. By contrast, under a mosaic approach, whether a particu-
lar aggregation of information constitutes a search is a question 
that must be litigated de novo in every case because, like snow-
flakes, every mosaic will necessarily be unique.403 We are also 
confident that the factors for evaluating the surveillance threat 
posed by a particular technology, such as scale, scope, and cost, 
are likely to be fewer and easier to apply with greater predicta-
bility than the many variables that would inform a mosaic 
analysis, where the idiosyncratic dispositions of judges likely 
would hold more than the usual sway.404
Critics of our technology-centered approach might also ar-
gue that law enforcement officers and agencies acting in their 
strategic modes will simply avoid Fourth Amendment regula-
tion by making minor changes to regulated surveillance tech-
nologies in an ongoing game of “technological whack-a-mole.”
  
405
 
this point. 
 
Here again, these sorts of strategic games are not without prec-
edent. For example, the advent of designer drugs has allowed 
 401. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474‒75 (1971) 
(finding no surprise and little weight in “the unstated proposition that when a 
line is drawn there is often not a great deal of difference between situations 
closest to it on either side”). 
 402. Id. 
 403. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953‒54 (2012); Kerr, 
supra note 33, at 343‒50. 
 404. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); see also Freiwald, 
supra note 41, at 5. 
 405. We owe this wonderful turn of phrase to Max Mishkin of Yale’s Infor-
mation Society Project. 
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manufacturers to simply change the chemical formulation of 
their products to avoid criminal liability—at least until the law 
catches up.406 Similar games are played in the patent world.407 
The solution in these contexts is often to focus on function ra-
ther than precise chemical structure.408 That same approach 
holds considerable promise in the present context to block at-
tempts by law enforcement circumnavigate Fourth Amendment 
regulations.409
This discussion does not exhaust all of the practical chal-
lenges that proposals to defend reasonable interests in quanti-
tative privacy must face. It nevertheless provides good grounds 
for believing that they can be met, and that our technology-
centered approach offers a far better alternative than proposals 
for case-by-case methods based on the mosaic theory. 
 
B. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND THE PUBLIC 
OBSERVATION DOCTRINE 
Another potential bar to judicial recognition of quantitative 
privacy is stare decisis and particularly United States v. 
Knotts.410 In Knotts, the Court held that using a beeper device 
to track a suspect’s car on public streets did not constitute a 
“search” because the suspect lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his public movements.411 The parallel between Knotts 
and Jones is obvious. In both cases, law enforcement officers 
used a passive signaling device attached to a car.412
 
 406. See generally Bertha K. Madras, Designer Drugs: An Escalating Public 
Health Challenge, 206 J. GLOBAL DRUG POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.dfaf.org/webinar/files/designer_drugs.pdf. 
 In both cas-
 407. Cf. Citron & Pasqual, supra note 22, at 1486 (exploring how fusion 
centers can engage in regulatory arbitrage by moving data mining to a juris-
diction with less restrictive privacy laws); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 223, 238 (2004) (discussing shifting of activity to jurisdictions 
with less regulatory restriction). 
 408. See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Inc., 339 
U.S. 605, 607‒08 (1950).  
 409. This is precisely the approach adopted by Switzerland in revisions to 
its privacy laws. See Susan Freiwald & Sylvain Métille, Reforming Surveil-
lance Law: The Swiss Model, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2013) (on 
file with authors) (describing how Swiss privacy laws are designed to accom-
modate changes in technology without requiring constant amendment to the 
codes themselves). 
 410. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 411. Id. at 281.  
 412. Id. at 278; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
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es, the devices revealed only movements on public streets.413 In 
both cases, those movements were exposed to public view.414 
Given these parallels, Knotts would seem to control in cases 
like Jones, thus barring Fourth Amendment review of GPS-
enabled tracking, drones, or data aggregation systems, so long 
as the technology is only used to monitor movements in pub-
lic.415
Our technology-centered approach avoids this entangle-
ment with stare decisis by providing easy grounds for distin-
guishing Knotts from cases that involve GPS-enabled tracking 
or other advanced surveillance technology like aerial drones.
 Should the Court eventually adopt the views expressed by 
the Jones concurrences, it therefore seems obliged to overrule 
Knotts.  
416 
The beeper technology used in Knotts was simply incapable of 
broad and indiscriminate surveillance. It could only provide di-
rectional information, not a suspect’s precise location.417 To be 
of any use at all, the beepers used in Knotts needed to be in 
close proximity to a dedicated radio receiver.418 Because no sta-
ble network of these receivers existed, officers had to follow the 
beepers, and hence the suspects, to track them.419 This beeper 
technology was thus little more than an adjunct to traditional 
human surveillance and therefore labored under the same 
practical limitations.420 That is why the Knotts Court ultimately 
held that the beeper technology used in that case “raise[d] no 
constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also 
raise.”421
The GPS-enabled tracking technology used in Jones and 
other technologies that threaten quantitative privacy are mate-
rially different.
  
422
 
 413. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 They therefore implicate markedly “different 
 414. Id. 
 415. It would have to be public movements. See United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705, 713‒14 (1984). 
 416. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
 417. With a stable network of receivers, officers might have been able to 
triangulate Knotts’s position. Cellular phone providers presently can locate 
subscribers’ phones using this same technique. See Susan Freiwald, Cell 
Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not 
Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 683 (2011). 
 418. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
 419. Id. 
 420. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 n.10 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 421. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
 422. See Hutchins, supra note 135, at 414–21. 
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constitutional principles.”423 GPS-enabled technology provides 
second-by-second location data. Like drones, GPS is precise, 
highly scalable, and increasingly inexpensive.424 Due to the 
nearly ubiquitous reach of satellite networks, GPS technology 
has extensive range and can locate devices within a range of 
several feet.425 Unlike the beeper technology in Knotts, GPS-
enabled tracking devices gather locational data without any 
need for human beings to “tail” targets.426 Officers can monitor 
the movements of a GPS-enabled device from anywhere at any 
time or automate their work by allowing a computer to do the 
monitoring for them.427 GPS networks can also cheaply track 
millions of devices, and algorithms can search unlimited hours 
of locational data for significant patterns.428 Thus, granting law 
enforcement unfettered access to GPS-enabled tracking tech-
nology raises the specter of a surveillance state.429
C. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND THE STATE 
AGENCY REQUIREMENT 
 The constitu-
tional distinction between Knotts and Jones is therefore not 
that officers exercised restraint in their use of technology in 
Knotts, but, rather, that the technology used in Knotts came 
with inherent constraints that limited its ability to facilitate 
broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance. The GPS tech-
nology used in Jones suffers no such limitations. 
In her concurring opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor sug-
gests that recognizing a constitutional dimension to quantita-
tive privacy might require “reconsider[ing] the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
 
 423. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. 
 424. Farhad Manjoo, Keeping Loved Ones on the Grid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2012, at D1. 
 425. See Hutchins, supra note 135, at 418–20. 
 426. Michael Ferraresi, GPS Makes Police Officers’ Job Easier, Safer, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/community/scottsdale/ 
articles/1007sr-technology07Z8.html. 
 427. Carrie Johnson and Steve Inskeep, GPS Devices Do the Work of Law 
Enforcement, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=130851849. 
 428. See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 2; Erik Eckholm, Private Snoops Find 
GPS Trail Legal to Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, at A1 (reporting that 
sales of GPS-enabled tracking devices surpass 100,000 a year and are rising); 
Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, WASH. POST, Aug. 
13, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/ 
article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html?nav=rss_metro/va. 
 429. Hutchins, supra note 135, at 421. 
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mation voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”430 Her concern 
seems to be that substantive Fourth Amendment interests 
threatened by broad and indiscriminate surveillance are no less 
at stake when information is gathered through private actors 
than when it is gathered or aggregated by the government di-
rectly.431
The Information Privacy Law Project has long been con-
cerned with privacy violations that citizens perpetrate against 
each other in their private roles. From the start, it has relied 
on, and responded to, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 
seminal 1890 article, which focused on violations of “the right 
‘to be let alone’”
 To the extent that she is right, it would appear that 
private data collections assembled by service providers, such as 
Verizon, or data brokers, like Acxiom, provide a wide avenue by 
which the government could circumnavigate efforts to protect 
Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy. Although 
compelling, we doubt that dramatic doctrinal changes are nec-
essary to meet Justice Sotomayor’s concerns. To explain why, 
let us first briefly elaborate two lines of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine that intersect with Justice Sotomayor’s concerns: the 
state action requirement and the third-party doctrine. 
432 perpetrated by the press to satisfy the “pru-
rient taste[s]” of its readership.433 In that spirit, scholars have 
drawn attention to the privacy implications of developing tech-
nology when wielded by private entities.434
 
 430. Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring); see also Crocker, supra note 
 Various efforts have 
204 (arguing for a modification of the 
third-party doctrine). 
 431. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957. 
 432. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). 
 433. Id. at 194–96. (“When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and 
crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what 
wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance. 
Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is 
never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no 
one can be surprised that it usurps the place of interest in brains capable of 
other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of 
feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under 
its blighting influence.”). Although credit is due to Alan Westin for creating 
the field of information privacy law, we regard Warren and Brandeis’s seminal 
1890 article as the first contribution to what has since come to be the Infor-
mation Privacy Law Project. See Danielle Citron, In Honor of Alan Westin: 
Privacy Trailblazer, Seer, and Changemaker, CONCURRING OPS. (Feb. 24, 
2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/in-honor-of-alan 
-westin-privacy-trailblazer-seer-and-changemaker.html. 
 434. See, e.g., SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 87, at 5–15. 
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also been made to develop legislative and common law protec-
tions.435 No matter how intrusive, however, these private in-
fringements are beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 
That is because, as the Court has long held, “the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbi-
trary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative.”436
An important consequence of this state agency require-
ment is that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated if the 
fruits of a private search are passed along to government 
agents.
  
437 That result does not change if the private search is 
unlawful.438 The state agency requirement therefore appears to 
have serious consequences for efforts to secure Fourth Amend-
ment interests in quantitative privacy. Faced with Fourth 
Amendment constraints, law enforcement might simply con-
tract with a private drone operator or private data aggregator 
to benefit indirectly from technology that it cannot use direct-
ly.439
The Fourth Amendment is implicated not only when gov-
ernment employees engage directly in a search, but also when a 
private party acts as an “agent or instrument of the 
[g]overnment.”
 Fortunately, existing doctrine closes this loophole.  
440 Whether a private party is considered an 
agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes 
“turns on the degree of the Government’s participation in the 
private party’s activities.”441 This is “a question that can only be 
resolved in light of all the circumstances.”442 That the 
“[g]overnment has not compelled a private party to perform a 
search does not, by itself, establish that the search is a private 
one.”443
 
 435. Among these is the American Law Institute’s recent commitment to 
draft a Restatement of Information Privacy Principles under the leadership of 
Paul Schwartz and Dan Solove as the Reporters. One of us (Citron) is part of 
the small group of scholars, judges, advocates, and industry leaders who will 
be helping to draft them.  
 For a private party to be considered a state actor, the 
government does not need to be “the moving force of the 
 436. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); Burdeau 
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
 437. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). 
 438. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475. 
 439. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Centers Tap Into Private Databases, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 2, 2008, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-02/news/ 
36868484_1_fusion-centers-databases-credit-reports. 
 440. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614–15. 
 441. Id. (citations omitted). 
 442. Id. at 614–15 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 443. Id. at 615. 
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search.”444 The private search does not even need to be done for 
the purpose of advancing a law enforcement purpose.445 All that 
is necessary is some “clear indic[ation] of the Government’s en-
couragement, endorsement, and participation.”446 This thresh-
old will usually be met where a private entity is directed or in-
centivized by the government, where the private entity 
reasonably believes that it is acting on state authority or direc-
tion, or where a government agent knows or has reason to 
know that the private entity is acting to advance state goals.447 
The direct participation of a government official in an other-
wise private search would certainly be enough.448 A contractual 
relationship or specific statutory authorization would also suf-
fice if it demonstrated a governmental “desire to share the 
fruits” of a private search.449
We suspect that, in most cases where the government’s 
benefitting from private surveillance or leveraging private data 
reservoirs would raise the specter of a surveillance state, there 
will also be sufficient evidence of government encouragement, 
sponsorship, or participation to bring the private entity’s activi-
ties under Fourth Amendment review. DAS, a joint Microsoft 
and NYPD project, is illustrative. The NYPD could not avoid 
Fourth Amendment regulation of DAS by simply outsourcing 
DAS and its operation to a private contractor because that con-
tractor would be acting as an agent of the NYPD.
  
450 The result 
would not be different if DAS was developed and deployed by a 
private company which then sold its services to the NYPD. To 
be of much benefit, the technology would need access to infor-
mation controlled by the government.451 The private company 
would also depend, in part or in whole, on income from gov-
ernment sources.452
 
 444. Cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949). 
 At the least, government would have an 
 445. Cf. id. 
 446. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615–16. 
 447. Id. 
 448. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). 
 449. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615–16. 
 450. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 72, 82 (2001). 
 451. We might say the same about Google’s involvement in building Virtual 
Alabama for Alabama’s Department of Homeland Security. See McKenna, su-
pra note 21. Under its license for the technology, Alabama can add data from 
all available sources. Virtual Alabama is also encouraging contributions from 
private entities in exchange for access to the system. If Google operated Virtu-
al Alabama and provided analysis to Alabama’s DHS, then Google should 
surely be considered a state agent with respect to those activities. 
 452. TORIN MONAHAN, SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME OF INSECURITY 47 
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abiding interest in the data, manifested by repeated requests 
for information. These facts would certainly be sufficient to 
show state agency. By contrast, if no such facts existed, then 
there would be no specter of a surveillance state.453 On this ac-
count, Verizon and other telecommunication companies that 
have been subject to FISA orders demanding the production of 
metadata for all domestic and international telephone commu-
nications on a rolling and continuous basis for many years run-
ning are acting as state agents—though perhaps unwilling—
when they collect and aggregate that data for the NSA and 
FBI.454
D. THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH AND THE THIRD-
PARTY DOCTRINE 
  
In addition to end-runs around the Fourth Amendment via 
the state-agency requirement, Justice Sotomayor’s concerns in 
Jones implicate the third-party doctrine, which holds that the 
Fourth Amendment is not violated if the government obtains 
information from a third party that an investigative target vol-
untarily shared with that third party.455
 
(2010) (describing trade shows devoted to private security contractors selling 
their wares to government agencies). 
 Applying this doctrine, 
the Court has held that there is no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion if a bank shares customers’ financial records with law en-
 453. Following Warren and Brandeis, we might nevertheless like to set 
limits on what these purely private entities do, but that would be a task for 
the political branches or the common law of torts, not the Fourth Amendment.  
 454. Cf. Ted Ullyot, Facebook Releases Data, Including all National Securi-
ty Requests, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 14, 2013), http://newsroom.fb.com/ 
News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Requests 
(“For the six months ending December 31, 2012, the total number of user-data 
requests Facebook received from any and all government entities in the U.S. 
(including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national securi-
ty-related requests)—was between 9,000 and 10,000. These requests run the 
gamut—from things like a local sheriff trying to find a missing child, to a fed-
eral marshal tracking a fugitive, to a police department investigating an as-
sault, to a national security official investigating a terrorist threat. The total 
number of Facebook user accounts for which data was requested pursuant to 
the entirety of those 9–10 thousand requests was between 18,000 and 19,000 
accounts.”). The same may well be true of companies such as Facebook, 
Google, and Apple who are ordered to participate in the NSA’s Prism program. 
Because the details of this program, including the technology used, the scope 
of aggregation, and the level of government access, have so far remained se-
cret, it is at this point premature to even speculate.  
 455. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
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forcement,456 or if a telephone company discloses records of 
phone calls customers have made or received.457 Although the 
Court has not been entirely clear on the underlying justifica-
tion for the third-party doctrine, the most coherent is that a 
person “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that 
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Govern-
ment” by lawful means.458 As the Court has pointed out, that 
risk does not diminish “even if the information is revealed [to 
the third party] on the assumption that it will be used only for 
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.”459
Law enforcement investigations frequently employ cooper-
ating witnesses, confidential informants, and even undercover 
police officers.
  
460
 
 456. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43; see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 
U.S. 21, 69 (1974) (holding that statute requiring banks to keep copies of cus-
tomers’ checks does not implicate the Fourth Amendment). Congress respond-
ed to Miller and Schultz by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22, which provides bank customers some privacy regarding 
their records held by banks and other financial institutions and stipulates pro-
cedures whereby federal agencies can gain access to those records. 
 No matter how surprised or dismayed the tar-
get of such investigative strategies may be, the third-party doc-
 457. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (explaining that a person 
who uses the phone “assume[s] the risk that the [telephone] company would 
reveal to police the numbers he dialed”). See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra 
note 87, at 205. (“The Pen Register Act attempt[ed] to fill the void left by 
Smith v. Maryland by requiring a court order to use a pen register or trap and 
trace device. Whereas a pen register records the [tele]phone numbers a person 
dials from [a] home, a trap and trace device creates a list of the telephone 
numbers of incoming calls.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2006).  
 458. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
751–52 (1971)). In Miller and other cases in the line, the Court has also sug-
gested that citizens retain no reasonable expectation of privacy at all in infor-
mation shared with third parties. See Smith 442 U.S. at 743‒44 (“This Court 
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 
442. This seems to be how Justice Sotomayor reads the rule as well. See Jones 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (describing the third-party doc-
trine as “the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”). This, of course, is 
far too broad, and if taken at face value would mean that Katz itself was 
wrongly decided insofar as the words intercepted by the government’s “elec-
tronic ear” in that case had been voluntarily shared by Katz with a third-party 
conversant. We therefore assume that the third-party doctrine relies on some 
version of the narrower misplaced trust rationale.  
 459. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 460. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (undercover 
agents); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (confidential informant); 
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (cooperating witness).  
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trine holds that he simply has no Fourth Amendment com-
plaint if those with whom he shared information in confidence 
decide to violate that trust, whether voluntarily, under force of 
subpoena, or by threat of contempt.461 In the age of data aggre-
gation, the stakes for privacy implicated by this third-party 
doctrine have grown dramatically.462 Vast reservoirs of our pri-
vate data are gathered by or otherwise reside in the hands of 
private entities.463 GPS chips in telephones, cars, or computers 
share a steady stream of information about our movements 
with companies that provide services associated with these de-
vices.464 Internet Service Providers and search engines log 
where we go and what we do online.465 Credit card companies 
and other vendors record and analyze our shopping habits.466 In 
all of these cases, the information is freely shared with a person 
or entity so they can provide a service or convenience.467 Under 
the third-party doctrine, we have no Fourth Amendment com-
plaint if recipients share that information with the govern-
ment.468
The implications for Fourth Amendment interests in quan-
titative privacy are obvious. What the government cannot col-
  
 
 461. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 53 (1974). 
 462. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Pub-
lic and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
241, 248–49 (2007). 
 463. See id.; Slobogin, supra note 53, at 7.  
 464. Christopher Williams, Police Use TomTom Data to Target Speed 
Traps, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 28, 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
technology/news/8480195/Police-use-TomTom-data-to-target-speed-traps.html. 
 465. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet In-
spection, in OFFICE OF PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, DEEP PACKET IN-
SPECTION: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS FROM INDUSTRY EXPERTS, available at 
http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-implications-of-deep-packet 
-inspection/. 
 466. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 467. See Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., con-
curring) (“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at 
the expense of privacy . . . .”). 
 468. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976) (holding that 
bank customers cannot raise a Fourth Amendment bar against government 
subpoena for bank records documenting their transactions because banks and 
their customers are parties to the underlying transactions, and customers 
must share information about those transactions with their banks in order for 
the banks to perform their roles); cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (“New technology 
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and 
many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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lect or aggregate directly, it can simply get from third parties 
with whom the information has been shared.469 If the govern-
ment lacks legal authority to install and monitor a GPS-
enabled tracking device, then it can get the same information 
by securing locational data from OnStar, Lojac, a cellular 
phone provider, or any number of “apps” that gather and use 
locational information as part of their services. This is not an 
abstract concern. As of this writing, a case is working its way 
through the New York courts involving a subpoena served on 
Twitter by the Manhattan District Attorney’s office seeking, 
among other things, locational data embedded in a user’s post-
ings.470 Both Twitter and the user moved to quash the subpoe-
na, but the Supreme Court denied both motions, relying in part 
on the third-party doctrine.471
As discussed in the Introduction, recently leaked docu-
ments reveal that every telecommunications company doing 
business in the United States has been subject to rolling orders 
issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court since at 
least 2006 demanding the production of “all call detail records 
or ‘telephony metadata’” for every domestic and international 
telephone call.
  
472 This metadata, when checked against other 
data, enable the discovery of callers’ identities, locations, social 
contacts, and group affiliations including the political, reli-
gious, and social, both mainstream and fringe.473 This is exactly 
the sort of detailed personal information that concerned the 
concurring justices in Jones.474
Whether implemented directly or indirectly through pri-
vate actors, the effects of the surveillance state on projects of 
personal development and democratic culture are likely to be 
the same. In fact, they might be worse. Much of the hope and 
promise of networked technologies is that they expand the ho-
rizons of our personal explorations and associations while 
providing diverse forums for civil society engagements that 
would otherwise be impractical or impossible. That potential 
 
 
 469. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 1451. 
 470. People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 471. Id. at 507; Megan Guess, Twitter Hands over Sealed Occupy Wall 
Street Protestor’s Tweets, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 14, 2012), http://arstechnica 
.com/tech-policy/2012/09/twitter-hands-over-occupy-wall-street-protesters 
-tweets/. 
 472. FISA, supra note 2, at 2. 
 473. Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 3. 
 474. United States v. Jones 132 S. Ct. 945, 963‒64 (2012) (Alito, J., concur-
ring); Id. at 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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would be severely compromised if we knew the government was 
or well might be watching everything we read, write, or do in 
the digital world.475 The problem remains if, rather than watch-
ing directly, the government could simply accomplish its sur-
veillance through third-party service providers. Of course, we 
could avoid being watched by simply withdrawing from these 
worlds; but, as one of us has argued elsewhere, this is a Hob-
son’s choice, at least insofar as liberty and democratic partici-
pation are valuable and constitutionally protected social 
goods.476
Among the strengths of our technology-centered approach 
is that it can guard against these concerns without needing to 
effect dramatic changes to the third-party doctrine. To see why, 
it is necessary to say a bit more about the doctrine’s conceptual 
structure. Although it overstates matters a bit to suggest that 
the third-party doctrine relies on “the premise that an individ-
ual has no reasonable expectations of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties,”
  
477
 
 475. Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total 
Surveillance’s Privacy Harms: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
 there is no doubt that 
the third-party doctrine has the same basic conceptual founda-
tion as the public observation doctrine. Although the universe 
of persons with whom we share information about our move-
ments in public is, at least in theory, larger than the universe 
of people with whom we share, say, information about our fi-
nancial transactions, in both cases the act of sharing affects our 
reasonable expectations of privacy. As we have argued at 
length in this Article, however, surveillance technology may 
raise Fourth Amendment issues independent of our expecta-
tions of privacy in the discrete bits of information gathered by 
that technology. The result would not be any different just be-
cause the information is shared with a small group of people 
rather than the public at large. In either case, Fourth Amend-
ment interests in quantitative privacy will be implicated if the 
technology used to gather the information raises the specter of 
a surveillance state by facilitating programs of broad, indis-
criminate surveillance. 
 476. Danielle Keats Citron, Hate 3.0: A Civil Rights Agenda to Combat 
Online Harassment (forthcoming 2014) (on file with autor); Danielle Keats 
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 105 (2009). 
 477. Jones, S. Ct. at 957; see also Crocker, supra note 204 (arguing for a 
modification of the third-party doctrine).  
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Let us return to the example of DAS. The System’s core 
function is to aggregate data from diverse sources, including 
traffic cameras, toll cameras, surveillance cameras, cell phone 
providers, GPS-based services, credit card companies, banks, 
and internet service providers. Although most of the data com-
ing into DAS when considered discretely would not implicate 
reasonable expectations of privacy under either the third-party 
doctrine or the public observation doctrine, DAS nevertheless 
epitomizes the surveillance state because its very function is to 
facilitate a program of broad and indiscriminate surveillance. 
Its deployment and use should therefore be subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation.  
The result should not be different if the aggregator is a 
private entity acting as a state-agent rather than the govern-
ment itself. Take as an example the data broker Acxiom, which 
uses proprietary technology to collect and mine a mind-boggling 
array of data about people from various public and third-party 
sources, including social network activity, property records, 
public-health data, criminal justice sources, car rentals, credit 
reports, postal and shipping records, utility bills, gaming, in-
surance claims, divorce records, browsing habits compiled by 
behavioral advertisers, and purchasing histories gathered us-
ing vendor discount cards, among other sources.478 Chris 
Hoofnagle has dubbed data brokers like Acxiom as “Big Broth-
er’s Little Helpers” because government and law enforcement 
are among their most important clients.479 With this level of 
government engagement, there is little doubt that Acxiom and 
its kin are state agents, at least when conducting business for 
or on behalf of the government.480
None of this requires abandoning or modifying the third-
party doctrine. It remains true that we have no Fourth 
 Thus, Acxiom’s activities 
should be subject to Fourth Amendment review when it is act-
ing as an arm of the government.  
 
 478. See Danielle Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries, CONCURRING 
OPS. (June 19, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/ 
2012/06/big-data-brokers-as-fiduciaries.html. 
 479. Hoofnagle, supra note 24, at 595.  
 480. So too are the many telephone and electronic communication compa-
nies that provide government agencies with user information so frequently 
that they have standing price lists describing what they charge to deploy their 
search and aggregation technologies for government purposes. See Andy 
Greenberg, These are the Prices AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint Charge for Cell-
phone Wiretaps, FORBES, Apr. 3, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
andygreenberg/2012/04/03/these-are-the-prices-att-verizon-and-sprint-charge 
-for-cellphone-wiretaps/. 
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Amendment complaint if a third party with whom we share in-
formation gathers that information in traditional ways and 
passes it along to the government. There is also no Fourth 
Amendment issue just because investigators collect a detailed 
mosaic of personal information on a suspect. Rather, it is the 
means that matter. Thus, the Fourth Amendment would not be 
implicated if a third party used pen registers or similar tech-
nology to gather evidence for the government because these 
technologies are too limited to facilitate the sort of broad and 
indiscriminate surveillance characteristic of a surveillance 
state.481 By contrast, the data aggregation technologies de-
ployed by Verizon and other telecommunications companies to 
provide the FBI and the NSA with “telephony metadata” for all 
calls “between the United States and abroad” and all calls 
“wholly within the United States, including local telephone 
calls”482 implicate “different constitutional principles.”483 By vir-
tue of their scale and scope, these data aggregation capacities 
epitomize a surveillance state when put at the service of gov-
ernment.484
 
 481. This is not to suggest that these more limited technologies do not raise 
serious privacy issues. Rather, the point is that those privacy interests must 
be addressed by the political branches through legislation or executive order 
rather than by the Fourth Amendment. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption 
and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 905, 931–39 (2008) (discussing state privacy legis-
lation); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 
 Verizon’s use of these technologies at the behest 
government agencies should therefore be subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation. 
87, at 202–08 (discussing vari-
ous legislative regimes regulating government access to third-party records 
that were passed in response to the Supreme Court’s refusal to find the Fourth 
Amendment applicable). Congress did of course step in to limit the use of pen 
registers. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2012). Although critics can certainly argue 
that the political branches’ records are hardly perfect on these scores, we pre-
fer constitutional humility and doctrinal parsimony to Fourth Amendment 
overreach. 
 482. FISA, supra note 2, at 2. 
 483. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
 484. As Jameel Jaffer put the point: 
From a civil liberties perspective, the program could hardly be any 
more alarming. It’s a program in which some untold number of inno-
cent people have been put under the constant surveillance of govern-
ment agents. It is beyond Orwellian, and it provides further evidence 
of the extent to which basic democratic rights are being surrendered 
in secret to the demands of unaccountable intelligence agencies. 
Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 3. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Recognizing a constitutional interest in quantitative priva-
cy buttresses Fourth Amendment defenses against a surveil-
lance state. Until now, practical limitations inherent to many 
investigative techniques, cultural constraints on mutual sur-
veillance, and existing Fourth Amendment doctrines have pro-
vided a virtual guarantee that traditional investigative tech-
niques would not produce the kind of broad and indiscriminate 
monitoring that raises the specter of a surveillance state. There 
simply are not enough police officers to follow all of us all of the 
time. As a society, we have stalwartly resisted the temptations 
of mutual surveillance that sustained many totalitarian states. 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has also preserved an archipelago 
of safe spaces and activities beyond the gaze of government 
agents. As a consequence, we have until now sustained a fairly 
stable balance between government power and private citizen-
ship that allows us to pursue projects of self-development free 
from fear that the government is watching.485
Recent technological developments, such as the NSA’s 
broad and indiscriminate data collection, aggregation, and re-
tention programs, New York’s Domain Awareness System, aer-
ial drones, and GPS-enabled tracking devices threaten to alter 
this balance. By their nature, these technologies make possible 
the monitoring of everyone all the time. As consequence, grant-
ing the government unfettered access to these technologies 
opens the door to a surveillance state and the tyranny it en-
tails. It is therefore at the point of unfettered access to those 
technologies that the Fourth Amendment should intervene. As 
we have argued here, this technology-centered approach to 
quantitative privacy holds great promise in our continuing ef-
forts to strike a reasonable balance between the competing in-
terests of law enforcement and citizen privacy while preserving 
the critical service of the Fourth Amendment as a bulwark 
against the rise of a surveillance state.  
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